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A BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO ANALYZING 
CORPORATE FAILURES 
A Mechele Dickerson* 
Recent corporate failures indicate that existing laws fail to give 
boards of directors adequate incentives to acknowledge that 
some financially troubled firms simply cannot be salvaged. 
Relying primarily on insights from law and behavioral science 
literature, this Article notes that directors have a natural 
tendency to underestimate risks and overestimate their ability 
to save an insolvent or near insolvent firm. This Article urges 
the imposition of a duty to file a timely bankruptcy petition 
because such a duty will encourage directors to consider the 
interests of all the firms' constituents, including workers, 
creditors, and the local community, when making decisions for 
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a financially troubled firm. This Article argues that directors 
of insolvent firms that fail to protect firms by placing them 
under the protection of federal bankruptcy laws should be 
sanctioned in the firm's subsequent bankruptcy. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Many businesses that file for bankruptcy are hopelessly 
insolvent, i.e., dead-on-arrival ("DOA''), before they even reach the 
bankruptcy court.1 This is not surprising, as boards of directors of 
businesses seem reluctant to admit that they lack the ability to save 
a financially troubled business. The magnitude of the recent 
corporate financial scandals2 and the likelihood that the 
questionable business practices the managers and directors of those 
firms used are more common than originally assumed caused 
Congress to enact sweeping corporate fraud legislation that 
1. See NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 308 
(1997) [hereinafter REPORT] (acknowledging that "Chapter 11 also attracts some 
'dead-on-arrival' businesses ... "). 
2. Recent large corporate financial debacles include Enron, WorldCom, 
Kmart, Conseco, and Adelphia. Enron was the seventh largest corporation in 
the United States before it filed for protection under Chapter 11 on December 2, 
2001. Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Enron Corp. Files Largest 
U.S. Claim for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2001, at Al. It was at that time 
the largest filing in U.S. history. Id. The July 21, 2002 bankruptcy filing of 
WorldCom surpassed it as the largest filing. Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas, 
Extra Level of Scrutiny in WorldCom Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2002, at 
Cl. Both WorldCom and Adelphia executives have been arrested on fraud 
charges. Kurt Eichenwald, 2 Ex-Officials at WorldCom Are Charged in Huge 
Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2002, at Al. Kmart executives misreported 
earnings, acquired two new planes for themselves, and created a "retention 
loan" program (then fabricated the true scope of the program to the board) that 
gave almost twenty-nine million dollars to executives who left or were 
discharged from the company. See Jennifer Dixon, Subsidiary Bought 2 Planes, 
Purchase Came Just Before Cash Ran Out, DETROIT FREE-PRESS, June 20, 2002, 
at A6; Amy Merrick, Kmart Studied Executive Conduct as a Focus of Its 
Internal Probe, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2003, at A3. Conseco filed for bankruptcy 
while it was facing a federal investigation of its accounting practices. See Jane 
Hoback & Gil Rudawsky, Former Conseco Exec Confident Firm Will Climb Out 
of Chapter 11, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 4, 2003, at C6. Finally, the trial, 
conviction, and ultimate demise of Arthur Andersen is a fallout of the Enron 
debacle. See Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Guilty in Effort to Block Inquiry on 
Enron, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2002, at A1 (discussing conviction "for impeding an 
investigation by securities regulators into the financial debacle at Enron" and 
announcing that Andersen "would cease auditing public companies"). 
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accomplishes the following: (1) tightens federal securities disclosure 
rules; (2) regulates the consulting relationships that audit 
companies have with businesses they audit; (3) increases the duties 
of audit committees of boards of directors; ( 4) prohibits certain 
insider trading; (5) enhances penalties for the destruction of 
documents needed in federal investigations or bankruptcy 
proceedings; and, ( 6) prevents corporate executives from using 
bankruptcy laws to avoid securities fraud liabilities.3 
This legislation is a good first step. However, while the 
proponents of the legislation may be correct in assuming that 
greater disclosures would have prevented the scandals associated 
with the Enron and WorldCom bankruptcies, it is unlikely that 
greater disclosures necessarily would have prevented the firms' 
financial difficulties. Since insolvency is inevitable for some firms, 
the question that remains to be answered is how (or whether) laws 
should encourage directors to place businesses under the protection 
of federal bankruptcy laws once they realize that the business is 
facing a financial crisis. 
Current corporate and bankruptcy laws give directors no 
incentive to timely place a firm in bankruptcy and fail to sanction 
directors who place a DOA firm in a Chapter 11 reorganization 
proceeding. Given the well-established behavioral tendency for 
actors to be overconfident about the risk that bad things will 
happen, 4 it is somewhat predictable that directors will be unwilling 
to place firms in bankruptcy since doing so acknowledges that they 
lack the ability to save the business or, even worse, may have made 
decisions that contributed to the firm's financial crisis. This Article 
argues that bankruptcy laws should encourage directors to place 
firms under the protection of the bankruptcy laws before the firm is 
hopelessly insolvent and that directors who fail to do so should be 
fined in any subsequent bankruptcy proceeding.5 
Part II of the Article relies on insights from law and behavioral 
science literature to explain why some directors might not admit 
that they lack the ability to save a financially troubled firm until it 
is too late for even the protections afforded by bankruptcy laws to 
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. §§ 103, 301, 306, 
402, 802-03 (2002). 
4. See discussion infra Part II. 
5. This Article does not consider the usefulness or efficiency of bankruptcy 
laws in general. Specifically, in arguing for a duty to file a timely bankruptcy 
petition I assume that bankruptcy laws will continue to allow firms to attempt 
to reorganize. I do not consider whether state law remedies are superior to 
those provided in the Federal Bankruptcy Code or whether unsecured creditors 
would fare better under applicable state law. I do, however, briefly discuss the 
arguments concerning Chapter ll's efficiency infra Part IV.A.3. 
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save it. This Part argues that the unwillingness of directors to 
admit defeat is consistent with a well-established behavioral trait: 
the overconfidence bias. I suggest that this bias will prevent some 
directors from filing timely bankruptcy petitions for their firms 
because placing the firm in bankruptcy would force them to publicly 
admit that they either made bad decisions in the past or that they 
simply lack the capacity to save the firm. This Part indicates that 
the tendency to make risky decisions based on a good faith (though 
misinformed) belief that those decisions will not harm the firm is 
natural and well-established and, in most cases, does not reflect any 
ill intent on the part of directors. 
Part III of this Article considers whether existing legal rules or 
market controls already give directors incentives to prevent DOA 
filings. The first section discusses the fiduciary duties directors of 
solvent firms owe shareholders and creditors and argues that those 
duties fail to give directors any incentives to avoid DOA filings. 
Indeed, this section suggests that the ambiguous nature of directors' 
duties once a firm is approaching insolvency gives directors an 
additional incentive to avoid early filings. This Part then 
demonstrates that current market controls fail to curb directors' 
tendencies to make decisions that allow them to continue to believe 
that their prior decisions are still valid. I suggest that these 
controls are particularly ineffective once directors either know the 
firm cannot be saved or conclude that they can make substantial 
financial gains by delaying the filing. 
The Article concludes by arguing that the law needs to impose 
sanctions to encourage directors to develop a more realistic 
expectation of their ability to resuscitate a financially troubled firm. 
Specifically, I argue that directors should have a "duty to timely file" 
and that they breach that duty if they fail to place firms in 
bankruptcy within thirty days of the time either the directors knew 
that the firm would be unable to pay its probable liability on its 
existing debts as they matured or when they knew (or should have 
known) that the firm's current liabilities exceeded the fair market 
value of its current tangible assets. 
II. BEHAVIORAL INFLUENCES ON DIRECTOR DECISION-MAKING 
It is worth saying as an initial matter that it is unrealistic (and 
unfair) to suggest that most directors are either intentionally 
corrupt or serve on boards with the single goal of looting the firm. 
Most directors intend to act in the best interest of the firm but may 
fail to do so for reasons completely unrelated to any desire to 
intentionally harm the firm. Certain behavioral traits may, in fact, 
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prevent directors from acting in the best interests of their firms. 6 
Overconfidence is a common human tendency, and highly 
successful people in particular have a tendency to overestimate their 
ability to control their environments and to avoid harm.7 The 
problem of the "overconfidence bias" is well-documented and 
recently has been discussed in the law and behavioral science 
literature.8 An actor is susceptible to this bias if she believes that 
the probability of a negative event happening to her is less than the 
likelihood of the event happening to someone else or, conversely, 
that it is more likely that a positive event will happen to her than 
the likelihood that a negative event will happen to her.9 This bias 
purportedly exists even if the actor is an expert and even if she 
knows the actual probability distribution of any particular event.10 
Likewise, behavioral studies suggest that people, especially 
successful ones, have an enhanced sense of their abilities to control 
events in their lives and that they will likely attribute positive 
outcomes to their own decision-making abilities.11 These tendencies 
combine to encourage people to accept too many risks based on their 
belief that adverse risks are unlikely to occur and that, in any event, 
they can prevent harm from occurring.12 
Behavioral studies also suggest that choices people make are 
"path-dependent."13 That is, people will be over committed to 
decisions they made, will often ignore or discount new information 
6. I am not suggesting that all directors have psychological biases. 
Instead, I suggest that the law should at least consider the possibility that 
certain psychological biases may cause directors unconsciously to make 
decisions that harm the business and that a stronger legal sanction may be 
needed to help directors overcome those biases. 
7. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: 
Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and 
Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 807 (2001). 
8. See Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive 
Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1659-61 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & 
Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality 
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1091-93 (2000). 
9. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 8, at 1091. 
10. See Jolls, supra note 8, at 1659 & nn.22-23 (citing studies); Korobkin & 
Ulen, supra note 8, at 1091-93 (citing psychological studies); Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and 
Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 758 (2000). 
11. See SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, POSITIVE ILLUSIONS: CREATIVE SELF-DECEPTION 
AND THE HEALTHY MIND 16 (1989); Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral 
Decision Theory in Legal Analysis: The Case of Liquidated Damages, 85 
CORNELL L. REV. 717, 723 (2000); Robert K. Rasmussen, Behavioral Economics, 
the Economic Analysis of Bankruptcy Law and the Pricing of Credit, 51 VAND. L. 
REV. 1679, 1689 (1998). 
12. See Hillman, supra note 11, at 723-24. 
13. See Langevoort, supra note 7, at 826. 
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that contradicts their belief that their prior decisions are correct, 
and will remain wedded to those decisions even if they later obtain 
information that should lead them to question the decisions.14 
Because their present decisions and choices are constrained by prior 
decisions, they will attempt to justifY and rationalize the continuing 
validity of prior decisions even though those decisions might appear 
questionable to an outsider who did not participate in the earlier 
decision-making process.15 Indeed, this tendency will cause them to 
seek out information that confirms the respectability of their prior 
decisions, 16 rather than seek information that suggests that those 
decisions were unwise (or are no longer wise).17 Even when 
confronted with potentially harmful information concerning risks, 
actors tend to interpret information in ways that serve their 
personal interests or pre-conceived notions.18 
Finally, behavioral studies indicate that most actors have the 
tendency to cut corners (but not feel guilty) if they think that their 
choices are ones reasonable people would make and will ultimately 
lead to a successful result. 19 Cognitive psychologists refer to this 
tendency, a form of cognitive dissonance, as the "sunk cost trap" 
whereby people incrementally make good faith (but overly 
optimistic) decisions which cause harm to the firm once an 
unexpected event occurs (such as a downturn in the economy).20 A 
director who does not recognize that what he is doing is 
unreasonable, irrational, or illegal will have little incentive to act 
consistently with any particular legal rule or duty unless he realizes 
that he faces significant penalties or the imposition of increased 
xt al 't . 21 e ern mom onng. 
Directors are probably more likely than the average person to 
14. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in 
Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 29 (2002); Langevoort, supra note 7, 
at 811; Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 11, 
26 (1998). 
15. See Langevoort, supra note 7, at 826; Rabin, supra note 14, at 26 
(noting that '"fresh' thinkers may be better at seeing solutions to problems than 
people who have meditated at length on the problems, because the fresh 
thinkers are not overwhelmed by the 'interference' of old hypotheses"); 
Rasmussen, supra note 11, at 1689-90. 
16. Rabin, supra note 14, at 26. 
17. See TAYLOR, supra note 11, at 27; Langevoort, supra note 7, at 826; 
Rasmussen, supra note 11, at 1689-90. 
18. See TAYLOR, supra note 11, at 28; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 8, at 
1093. 
19. See Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe's Shadow: The 
SEC's Pursuit of Managerial Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 482 (2001). 
20. See id. at 481-83 (discussing how sunk cost trap and overoptimism bias 
may affect corporate officers' decision-making process). 
21. Id. 
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be overconfident about their abilities to make correct decisions. 
Unfortunately, directors who are susceptible to the overconfidence 
bias will be less likely to admit that they cannot save a financially 
troubled firm until it is too late for anyone (including a bankruptcy 
judge) to resuscitate the firm. Because the overconfidence bias 
causes people who are factually informed of the likelihood ofharm to 
make incorrect decisions, even directors with full knowledge of the 
firm's finances may still be unrealistically optimistic about the 
firm's ability to recover.22 Indeed, the behavioral tendencies to be 
overconfident and over committed to prior decisions cause directors 
to try to find ways to justify the reasonableness of their prior 
decisions rather than focusing on taking steps to remedy the firm's 
existing solvency problems. 
Ill. EXISTING CONTROLS FAIL TO CONSTRAIN DIRECTORIAL 
DECISION MAKING 
A Fiduciary Duties 
Directors have no explicit duty to consider whether it is in the 
firm's interests for directors to reEnquish exclusive control over the 
firm by either seeking help from external insolvency or turnaround 
experts, or by placing it under the control and protection of federal 
bankruptcy laws. Because current corporate laws do impose broad 
fiduciary duties on directors, the desire to avoid the monetary 
liability, inconvenience, and potential embarrassment associated 
with litigation arguably gives directors an incentive to avoid DOA 
filings, thus protecting the firm's interests. As the next sections 
demonstrate, however, directors' unwillingness to harm (and 
potentially eliminate) shareholders' interests by placing the firm in 
bankruptcy is likely attributable to the vague nature of the 
directors' fiduciary duties to shareholders and other constituents of 
the firm both before and after a firm becomes insolvent. Thus, the 
behavioral tendency to avoid an early filing combined with vague 
legal rules naturally results in directors' reluctance to file early 
bankruptcy petitions. 
1.. Solvent Businesses 
a. To shareholders. Boards of directors are given the authority 
to control and manage the firm's assets within the confines of the 
powers provided in the corporate charter.23 These broad powers give 
22. See Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1175, 1183 (1997) (explaining common behavioral biases). 
23. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1974) ("The business and 
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directors the authority to file early bankruptcy petitions for 
businesses, but neither require timely filings nor sanction directors 
who cause DOA filings. 24 Most states' corporate laws impose two 
broad fiduciary duties on the directors of solvent firms-the duty to 
avoid self-dealing (i.e., the duty of loyalty) and the duty of care.25 
Directors arguably have moral obligations to the firm as well, 
though these moral duties are generally encompassed by the legal 
duties of loyalty and care.26 The duty ofloyalty requires directors to 
protect the firm's interests by refraining from engaging in acts that 
benefit themselves, but harm the firm. 27 Directors will be held liable 
for breaching the duty of loyalty either when they used their 
positions of trust and access to confidential information to 
participate in transactions in which they have an interest,26 or 
because they placed their own interests before those of the firm. 29 A 
affairs of every corporation ... shall be managed by or under the direction of a 
board of directors."); REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (1985) (stating 
that the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed under the 
direction of the board of directors). 
24. REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.0l(b). 
25. See R. Link Newcomb, Note, The Limitation of Directors' Liability: A 
Proposal For Legislative Reform, 66 TEX. L. REV. 411, 433 (1987) ("Courts 
impose liability on directors for failing to exercise care, which shifts the risk of 
loss from shareholders to directors for particular business decisions made by 
the board. Two rationales justify this shift. Placing the burden of risk upon 
decision makers both compensates shareholders for their losses and serves to 
deter directors from careless decision making."). See generally Zipora Cohen, 
Directors' Negligence Liability to Creditors: A Comparative and Critical View, 
26 J. CORP. L. 351, 352 (2001) (discussing the rationale behind imposing 
liability on corporate directors); Thomas C. Lee, Comment, Limiting Corporate 
Directors' Liability: Delaware's Section 102(b)(7) and the Erosion of the 
Directors' Duty of Care, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 239, 261-69 (1987) (comparing 
traditional tort concepts to the duty of care in the corporate context). 
26. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and 
Officers, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 945, 948 (1990). Those moral obligations would 
include the duties to: reasonably monitor or oversee the conduct of the firm's 
business and take steps to ensure that reasonably adequate information flows 
to the board; follow up on the information the board acquires; employ a 
reasonable decision-making process; make reasonable decisions. I d. 
27. 1 WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE 
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 122 (6th ed. 1998). 
28. Whether a director is an interested party varies by state law but 
generally includes situations where the director is a party to a transaction 
involving the firm, has a financial or familial relationship with a party to such a 
transaction, or is subject to a controlling interest by a party to the transaction. 
See 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 1.23 (1994) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE]. 
29. Ledbetter v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 85 F.3d 1537, 1540 (11th 
Cir. 1996); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). An interested 
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director who participates in a self-interested transaction involving 
the firm typically will be . held liable for a breach of the duty of 
loyalty unless non-interested directors or shareholders approve the 
self-interested transaction after full disclosure, or the transaction is 
objectively or intrinsically fair to the corporation.30 
In general, directors breach the duty of care when they fail to 
act diligently and prudently in managing the firm's affairs and their 
ill-advised decisions negligently cause harm to the firm. 31 In 
considering whether a director has breached the duty of care, courts 
evaluate the information available to the directors, the actual 
decision that ultimately caused harm, and the good faith or 
rationality of the process the directors employed before they made 
the harmful decision.32 The duty of care thus monitors directors' 
oversight and decisional capacities by requiring them to be informed 
of all material information reasonably available to them and to 
make decisions with a reasonable amount of attention and skill.33 
While the duty of care primarily focuses on decisions directors 
make that ultimately harm the firm or its shareholders, directors 
also have an affirmative duty to act in circumstances in which due 
attention would prevent a loss.34 Allegations that directors have 
breached the duty of care because of their failure to act most often 
involve claims that a director failed to adequately supervise firm 
employees or to monitor top firm executives. Directors (especially 
officer or director has the duty to disclose all known material facts relating to 
the conflict of interest and the transaction that a reasonable person would 
consider important when voting on the transaction. See Weinberger v. UOP, 
Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 
supra note 28, § 1.14. 
30. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (1974); Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 
1366, 1376 (Del. 1993); Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 
1280 (Del. 1989); Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710; 1 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 
27, at 122. 
31. See In re Caremark Int'l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996); 1 
KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 27, at 77-78. 
32. Section 8.30 of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act provides 
the statutory approach to the duty of care that most states follow. Section 8.30 
provides that directors must discharge their duties "(1) in good faith; (2) with 
the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under 
similar circumstances; and (3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the 
best interests of the corporation." REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§ 8.30 (1985); 
see also Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1209 (5th Cir. 1982); Steinberg v. 
Kendig (In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, Inc.), 225 B.R. 646, 652 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 1998). See generally PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 28, 
§ 4.01(a) (discussing a director's duty of care). 
33. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993), modified, 
636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994); Smith, 488 A.2d at 872-73. 
34. In re Caremark Int'l Inc., 698 A.2d at 967. 
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outside directors) typically will have neither the time nor ability to 
closely monitor the firm's daily operations or firm managers' day-to-
day decisions.35 Given this, directors may have no actual knowledge 
of improper managerial acts, either because they have been misled 
by firm managers, or because they have simply failed to detect that 
managers have engaged in harmful conduct, such as causing the 
firm to violate applicable laws or regulations. 36 
Directors arguably breach the duty of care if they wait until a 
firm is DOA before placing it under the protection of bankruptcy 
laws .or if they fail to supervise firm managers who engage in acts 
that cause the firm's insolvency. However, allegations that directors 
breached the duty of care are reviewed under the highly deferential 
business judgment rule.37 The business judgment rule is designed to 
encourage directors to freely exercise their managerial discretion 
and to remove uncertainty from corporate transactions by avoiding 
an ex post appraisal of the managers' decisions.38 Under the 
business judgment rule, director liability is predicated upon 
35. Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 35; Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of 
Directors and Internal Control, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 237, 237 (1997); Ira M. 
Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, Essay, The Active Board of Directors and 
Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 
1283-86 (1998). 
36. To avoid breaching the duty of care for failing to prevent illegal 
corporate activities, directors must generally monitor managers' acts, but need 
not possess detailed information about all aspects of the firm's operation, nor 
routinely interrogate all employees (unless there are grounds to suspect 
deception). Directors typically satisfy the duty to monitor by assuring that the 
firm has a good information and reporting system (i.e., by creating corporate 
compliance programs) or by specifically delegating oversight responsibilities to 
their audit or ethics committees or to third-parties acting on the firm's behalf 
(and subject to the directors' control). In re Care mark Int'l Inc., 698 A.2d at 970 
(finding that: 
a director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to 
assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which the 
board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so under 
some circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable 
for losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards[)]. 
See also Eisenberg, supra note 35, at 252 (noting that "(t]he most significant 
instrument for executing" the directors' duty to monitor is internal and possibly 
external auditing). 
37. See Ajay Sports, Inc. v. Casazza, 1 P.3d 267, 275 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000); 
Smith, 488 A.2d at 872-73. 
38. Ajay Sports, Inc., 1 P.3d at 275; Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 360 ("The rule 
operates to preclude a court from imposing itself unreasonably on the business 
and affairs of a corporation."); Smith, 488 A.2d at 872; Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt 
Chern. Corp., No 7547, 1987 Del. Ch. LEXIS 522, at *9-10 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 
1987). 
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concepts of gross negligence, not reasonableness.39 Unless it can be 
shown that the directors acted with the primary goal of 
accomplishing an impermissible purpose, decisions made by 
disinterested directors who used a rational, deliberately considered 
process to be informed or who made a good faith effort to advance 
the firm's interests typically will be shielded from liability.40 Thus, 
while shareholders theoretically can sue directors who made 
decisions that harmed the firm, or who failed to act to prevent harm 
(including hopeless insolvency) to the firm, the business judgment 
rule ensures that successful suits against directors will be rare.41 
39. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 262-63 (Del. 2000). Gross negligence 
typically is defined as "reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the 
whole body of stockholders or actions that are without the bounds of reason." 
Potter v. Pohlad, 560 N.W.2d 389, 392 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). If the business judgment rule is not applicable, directors are 
liable for simple negligence. 1 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 27, at 84; see also 
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) (holding that 
directors "are bound to use that amount of care which ordinarily careful and 
prudent men would use in similar circumstances"). 
40. Smith, 488 A.2d at 873; Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 
1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm, 7 46 A.2d 244. Indeed, many 
scholars argue that this rule virtually eliminates liability for breaching the duty 
of care as long as directors show that their decision was made on an informed 
basis, in good faith and in the belief that the decision was in the firm's best 
interests even if the decision is later found to have been substantively wrong, 
unreasonable or irrational. See, e.g., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAw§ 3.4 
(1986) (suggesting that "the mere mention of the business judgment rule brings 
smiles of relief to" directors' faces); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team 
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 299-300 (1999) ("[I]n 
practice the duty of care is all but eviscerated by a legal doctrine known as the 
'business judgment rule.'"); Alan R. Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate 
Fiduciary Model: A Director's Duty of Independence, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1351, 1361-
62 (1989) ("Courts accord near-complete deference to corporate decisions 
untainted by interest."). 
41. Indeed, suits for all reasons by creditors or shareholders against 
directors for breaching their fiduciary duties appear to be quite rare. See Lynn 
M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy 
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 709-
10 (1993) [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance]. Moreover, 
largely in response to Smith v. Van Gorkom, a Delaware decision that expanded 
director liability for breach of the duty of care, states quickly adopted "charter 
option" statutes that allowed corporations to include exculpatory clauses in 
their articles of incorporation that eliminate the personal liability of directors 
for monetary damages resulting from a breach of the duty of care owed to 
shareholders. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). Directors 
would remain liable for breaches of the duty of loyalty, bad faith, intentional 
misconduct, knowingly violating the law, improperly paying dividends, or 
engaging in transactions in which they receive an improper personal benefit. 
See, e.g., id. 
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b. To non-shareholders. If a firm is solvent, directors generally 
will owe no fiduciary duties to employees or creditors42 and instead 
must act in good faith consistent with the actual or implied 
contract. 43 It is unclear how to define directors' duties to involuntary 
creditors (the best example being tort creditors), since they did not 
choose to have a relationship with the firm and thus cannot rely on 
contractual rights. Directors are deemed not to have fiduciary 
duties to non-shareholders largely because of the prevailing view 
that corporations are managed by directors and officers for the sole 
purpose of maximizing shareholder interests.44 This view recently 
42. Nahman v. Jacks (In re Jacks), 243 B.R. 385, 390 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
1999) (citing California law), affd in part and rev'd in part, 266 B.R. 728 (9th 
Cir. 2001); Steinberg v. Kendig (In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, Inc.), 225 B.R. 
646, 652 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998) (citing Delaware law); In re Revco D.S., Inc., 
118 B.R. 468, 507-08 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990) (noting Delaware courts' refusal 
to recognize any fiduciary duty to creditors of solvent firms); Browning 
Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 454 F. Supp. 88, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 
(stating that neither firm nor directors owe fiduciary duties to creditors); 
Connolly v. Agostino's Ristorante, Inc., 775 So. 2d 387, 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2000) (citing Florida law, "the general rule is that directors do not owe creditors 
duties beyond the relevant contractual terms absent 'special circumstances' 
... "); Whitley v. Carolina Clinic, 118 N.C. App. 523, 526, 455 S.E.2d 896, 899 
(1995) (citing North Carolina law, "[a]s a general rule, directors of a corporation 
do not owe a fiduciary duty to creditors of the corporation"). But see Brandt v. 
Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco Int'l, Inc.), 208 B.R. 288, 300-01 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1997) (concluding that the directors who approved a leveraged buy-out 
that ultimately caused the firm to file a Chapter 7 petition had a duty to 
creditors even though the decision to approve the LBO was made when the firm 
was solvent), affd in part, Comm'r of Revenue v. Brandt (In re Healthco Int'l, 
Inc.), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15379 (D. Mass. July 8, 2001). 
43. See In re Lifschultz Fast Freight, 132 F.3d 339, 346 (7th Cir. 1997); 
United States v. Jolly, 102 F.3d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1996); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. 
RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Katz v. Oak Indus., 
Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986); see also Robert Charles Clark, The 
Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARv L. REv. 505 (1977); 
Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and 
Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982); Robert S. Summers, "Good 
Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195 (1968); Christopher L. Barnett, Note & 
Comment, Healthco and the "Insolvency Exception": An Unnecessary Expansion 
of the Doctrine?, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 441, 441-43 (2000). 
44. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 119-20 (1991); Bernard Black & Reinier 
Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1911, 
1921 (1996) ("The efficiency goal of maximizing the company's value to investors 
remains, in our view, the principal function of corporate law."); Bernard S. 
Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 521 (1990) 
(noting that "[i]n theory, the shareholders of public companies elect directors, 
who watch corporate officers, who manage/watch the company on the 
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has been challenged by scholars who argue that viewing public 
corporations as a bundle of privately-owned rights is unrealistic 
because corporations are a community of interests.45 These 
"communitarian" scholars suggest that directors' fiduciary duties 
are to the firm itself (not exclusively to shareholders) and that 
directors have a duty to consider the needs and interests of non-
shareholder interests (like employees, trade creditors, suppliers, and 
the local community) during the decision-making process.46 
Consistent with this view, some state constituency statutes now 
shield directors from liability to shareholders if they consider non-
shareholder interests during the decision-making process.47 
shareholders' behalf'); Deborah A DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of 
Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 917 (1988) (commenting that "the 
notion that in theory a corporation's 'own' interests could diverge from those of 
its shareholders is difficult to fathom"); Michael C. Jensen & William H. 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, in FOUNDATIONS OF 
CORPORATE LAW 8 (Roberta Romano ed., 1993). 
45. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 40, at 260-61; Daniel J.H. 
Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate Managers 
Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1023 (1996) (noting that 
communitarians disagree with the traditional view of corporate law's primary 
purpose: "to ensure that managers act as agents for the shareholder owners"); 
Nell Minow, Shareholders, Stakeholders, and Boards of Directors, 21 STETSON 
L. REV. 197, 218 (1991) (explaining stakeholder theory of corporate law which 
emphasizes duties to constituencies beyond shareholders); Marleen A 
O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to 
Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 899, 946-65 
(1993) (advocating for a "neutral referee model" where directors would serve to 
balance the competing interests of employees and shareholders); cf John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance As a Multi-Player Game, 
78 GEO. L.J. 1495 (1990); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the 
Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of 
Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 24 (1991) (emphasizing the 
need for "gap-filling responsibilities" to protect the interests of non-shareholders 
of a corporation); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 
261-62 (1990) (discussing the emergence of public interests into the law 
governing corporate activity). 
46. See, e.g., David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223, 
225 (1991) (discussing constituency statutes and the new conception these laws 
create about a corporation's role in society); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical 
and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 
TEX. L. REV. 579, 582-83 (1992) (questioning the traditional notion that 
"directors ought to be accountable exclusively to stockholders"); Marleen A 
O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a 
Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1203-10 
(1991) (advocating for protection of employees' interests in a corporation 
through a legal model of corporations where rights are defined "through a set of 
explicit and implicit contracts"). 
47. For a list of the statutes, see Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of 
Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the "Race" Debate 
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Regardless of whether as a normative matter directors should 
act solely to maximize shareholders' interests, as a descriptive 
matter, maximizing shareholder wealth remains the primary goal of 
directors of American firms. In addition, there are a number of 
policy and pragmatic reasons to limit directors' direct liability to 
non-shareholders. First, exposing directors to increased legal 
exposure from a multiplicity of potentially unfounded claims will 
impede their ability to function as corporate directors and 
necessarily will increase administrative costs largely because 
directors may demand additional directors' and officers' ("D&O") 
liability insurance to cover these additional risks.48 Moreover, 
treating non-shareholders as beneficiaries of the directors' fiduciary 
duties of loyalty and care potentially could overwhelm the courts 
and lead to inconsistent results since different constituents could file 
suits in different jurisdictions that have divergent standards for the 
directors' fiduciary duties. Finally, giving non-shareholders 
standing to sue the directors of solvent firms for the breach of a 
fiduciary duty exposes directors to the risk of double liability, since 
they presumably also can be sued by shareholders for breaching 
those same duties. 
2. Insolvent Businesses 
Though directors and managers are deemed to manage an 
insolvent firm's assets for the benefit of creditors and potentially 
shareholders or others with an interest in the firm,49 they have no 
and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1828 tbl.3 (2002). See 
also Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State 
Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45, 45 (1991) (noting 
constituency statutes recognize protection for many groups including 
"managers, creditors, employees, customers, suppliers, and local communities"). 
48. See Melanie K. Palmore, Comment, "Insured us. Insured" Exclusions in 
Director and Officer Liability Insurance Policies: Is Coverage Available When 
Chapter 11 Trustees and Debtors-in-Possession Sue Former Directors and 
Officers?, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 101, 102 (1992) (noting increase in D&O liability 
insurance due to the rising standard of care imposed on directors). 
49. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 
343, 355 (1985) (stating that the managers of the debtor-in-possession are 
fiduciaries); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939); Pay 'N Pak Stores v. 
Court Square Capital (In re PNP Holdings Corp.), 141 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 
1998); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co. (In re JKJ Chevrolet, 
Inc.), 26 F.3d 481, 485 (4th Cir. 1994); Unsecured Creditors Comm. of Debtor 
STN Enters., Inc. v. Noyes, 779 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir. 1985); Fed. Deposit Ins. 
Corp. v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976-77 (4th Cir. 1982); Clarkson Co. v. 
Shaheen, 660 F.2d 506, 512 (2d Cir. 1981); Steinberg v. Kendig, (In re Ben 
Franklin Retail Stores, Inc.), 225 B.R. 646, 653-54 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998); 
Berres v. Bruning (In re Bruning), 143 B.R. 253, 255-56 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992) 
(finding that a trust arises in favor of creditors upon the firm's insolvency); Fox 
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fiduciary or statutory duty to protect the firm by filing a timely 
bankruptcy petition. Moreover, though directors remain fiduciaries 
of the firm once it becomes insolvent and they have additional duties 
to protect the interests of creditors upon the firm's insolvency,50 
there is no generally accepted definition for "insolvency."51 Courts 
have defined insolvency either as a firm's inability to pay bills as 
they mature in the ordinary course of the business (equitable 
insolvency)52 or when the fair market value of the firm's assets is 
less than its total liabilities (bankruptcy or balance sheet 
insolvency).53 Other courts suggest that directors breach their 
fiduciary duties to creditors if decisions thW make when the firm is 
solvent cause the firm to become insolvent. Moreover, a prominent 
Delaware state court opinion suggests that directors' fiduciary 
duties to creditors start before actual insolvency when the firm is 
approaching insolvency, i.e., when it is in the ''vicinity of 
v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 141, 143 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); St. 
James Capital Corp. v. Pallet Recycling Assocs. ofN. Am., Inc., 589 N.W.2d 511, 
514-15 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999); Ass'n of Haystack Prop. Owners, Inc. v. Sprague, 
494 A.2d 122, 125 (Vt. 1985); JAMES D. Cox ET AL., CORPORATIONS§ 10.18 (1995) 
(discussing body of law that imposes on directors fiduciary duties to creditors 
when the firm is insolvent). 
50. Directors of insolvent firms are deemed to have fiduciary duties to 
creditors because shareholders' residual interests in an insolvent firm are 
worthless and cannot be paid until creditors' claims are paid in full. See 
Christopher W. Frost, The Theory, Reality and Pragmatism of Corporate 
Governance in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 103, 107-08 
(1998); Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper 
Scope of Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46 V AND. L. REV. 1485, 1512 (1993). 
51. See, e.g., Ramesh K.S. Rao et al., Fiduciary Duty a la Lyonnais: An 
Economic Perspective on Corporate Governance in a Financially-Distressed 
Firm, 22 J. CORP. L. 53, 61 (1996); Andrew D. Shaffer, Corporate Fiduciary-
Insolvent: The Fiduciary Relationship Your Corporate Law Professor (Should 
Have) Warned You About, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 479, 513 (2000). 
52. LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Perelman, 82 F. Supp. 2d 279, 290 (D. Del. 2000). 
53. Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 789 (Del. Ch. 1992). 
Statutes provide yet more definitions. The Bankruptcy Code defines an 
insolvent debtor as one whose debts exceed the fair market value of its 
property. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (1994). The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act 
defines insolvency to occur when the debtor's present fair salable value of assets 
is less than the amount required to pay its probable liability on its existing 
debts as they mature. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT§ 2(1) (1992). The 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act defines insolvency to occur when the debtor's 
debts exceed the fair valuation of the debtor's assets and presumes a debtor is 
insolvent when it is generally not paying its debts as they become due. UNIF. 
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT§ 2(a)-(b) (1999). The lack of a generally accepted 
method to value the assets or liabilities adds even another layer of 
unpredictability. Rao et al., supra note 51, at 63 (noting lack of consensus on 
appropriate measure to value assets or liabilities). 
54. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d at 977; Clarkson Co., 660 F.2d at 512. 
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insolvency."55 Finally, courts recently have been willing to allow 
creditors to sue directors and officers based on a theory of 
"deepening insolvency." Under this theory, directors, officers, their 
accountants or lawyers who negligently or fraudulently extend an 
insolvent company's life by concealing or misrepresenting the 
company's true state of insolvency may be held liable to the firm's 
creditors.56 
In addition to the uncertainty concerning the meaning of 
"insolvency," there is a breadth of views concerning the scope of 
directors' post-insolvency fiduciary duties.57 Some courts and 
commentators narrowly characterize directors' duties as the 
traditional pre-insolvency duties (duty of care and duty of loyalty) 
55. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 
No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
56. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 
267 F.3d 340 (3d Cir. 2001); Tabas v. Greenleaf Ventures, Inc. (In re Flagship 
Healthcare, Inc.), 269 B.R. 721 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2001); Steinberg v. Kendig (In 
re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, Inc.), 225 B.R. 646, 655 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998). 
The deepening insolvency cause of action is similar to the liability imposed on 
directors of non-U.S. firms who cause a business to trade while insolvent. See 
Australian Companies Act, 1993, § 588G (Austl.); Insolvency Act, 1986, §§ 213-
14, 247 (Eng.). 
57. Courts are also split over whether the business judgment rule shields 
directors from liability for creditors' breach of fiduciary claims. Compare 
Comm. of the Creditors of Xonics Med. Sys., Inc. v. Haverty (In re Xonics, Inc.), 
99 B.R. 870, 876 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (applying the rule), with Mims v. 
Kennedy Capital Mgmt., Inc. (In re Performance Nutrition, Inc.), 239 B.R. 93, 
111 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1999) (refusing to apply the rule), and Askanse v. Fatjo, 
No. H-91-3140, 1993 WL 208440 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 1993) (same), affd, 130 
F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 1997). If the duty applies, decisions the directors made 
during the firm's insolvency presumably will be deemed to have been taken in 
good faith as long as the directors were adequately informed and utilized a 
rational decision-making process. 
For a general discussion of directors' duties, see Daniel B. Bogart, 
Unexpected Gifts of Chapter 11: The Breach of a Director's Duty of Loyalty 
Following Plan Confirmation and the Postconfirmation Jurisdiction of 
Bankruptcy Courts, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 303, 310-13 (1998) [hereinafter Bogart, 
Unexpected Gifts]; Daniel B. Bogart, Liability of Directors of Chapter 11 Debtors 
in Possession: "Don't Look Back-Something May Be Gaining On You," 68 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 155 (1994); Richard M. Cieri et al., The Fiduciary Duties of 
Directors of Financially Troubled Companies, 3 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 405 
(1994); Carlos J. Cuevas, The Myth of Fiduciary Duties in Corporate 
Reorganization Cases, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 385 (1998); Harvey R. Miller, 
Corporate Governance in Chapter 11: The Fiduciary Relationship Between 
Directors and Stockholders of Solvent and Insolvent Corporations, 23 SETON 
HALL L. REv. 1467 (1993); Robert B. Millner, What Does it Mean for Directors of 
Financially Troubled Corporations to Have Fiduciary Duties to Creditors?, 9 J. 
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 201 (1999); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation's 
Obligations to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 647 (1996); Shaffer, supra note 51. 
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owed to shareholders, 58 others suggest that directors have only 
contractual duties (duty of good faith and fair dealing) to creditors, 59 
while others suggest that directors are required only to act legally 
and not "divert, dissipate or unduly risk [the firm's] assets.',so 
Where there are allegations of fraud, self-dealing or preferential 
treatment, a director's liability to creditors is less ambiguous.61 In 
addition, directors who make either fraudulent62 or preferential63 
58. See, e.g., Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 274 (1951) (discussing 
prohibition against trustees allowing insiders to engage in self-interested 
trading); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Weaver, 680 F.2d 451, 461 (6th Cir. 1982) 
(discussing fiduciary duties of due care). Most courts and commentators 
assume that directors' state law fiduciary duties continue during the 
bankruptcy case. See Comm. of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims v. Citicorp 
Venture Capital, Ltd. (In re Papercraft Corp.), 187 B.R. 486, 498-500 (Bankr. 
W.D. Pa. 1995); In re Harp, 166 B.R. 740, 746 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993). Because 
the federal Bankruptcy Code does not prescribe the duties, the duties could be 
based on state corporate law or federal common law. See generally Bogart, 
Unexpected Gifts, supra note 57, at 309-10 (discussing directors' fiduciary duties 
in Chapter 11 proceedings); C.R. Bowles, Jr. & Nancy B. Rapoport, Has the 
DIP's Attorney Become the Ultimate Creditors' Layer in Bankruptcy 
Reorganization Cases?, 5 AM. BANKR. lNST. L. REV. 47, 53-54 (1997). 
59. See Ann E. Conaway Stilson, Reexamining the Fiduciary Paradigm at 
Corporate Insolvency and Dissolution: Defining Directors' Duties to Creditors, 20 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6, 92 (1995) (arguing that the duty to creditors should be 
rejected because creditors are adequately protected by contract and commercial 
law or by the common law of fraud). 
60. Steinberg, 225 B.R. at 656; see also St. James Capital Corp. v. Pallet 
Recycling Assocs. of N. Am., Inc., 589 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) 
(stating that directors do not have a duty to creditors to "minimize any loss that 
may occur as a result of the corporation's insolvency" because to impose such a 
duty would allow creditors "to interfere unduly and interject themselves in the 
day-to-day management ofthe corporation"). 
61. For example, a director/shareholder who pays himself a salary, but 
neglects to pay creditors' debts, breaches his fiduciary duty to creditors. Pepper 
v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307-08 (1939). Similarly, directors who prolong a firm's 
corporate life by incurring debt based on misleading financial information and 
causing the firm to sink deeper into insolvency breach their fiduciary duties to 
creditors. Steinberg, 225 B.R. at 656. Moreover, directors consistently are 
deemed to have breached their duties to creditors if they withdraw 
substantially all assets from the firm without leaving sufficient resources to pay 
the firm's debts, dissipate assets, put firm assets at risk, or if they divert firm 
assets to themselves, other insiders, or preferred creditors. See Pierce v. United 
States, 255 U.S. 398, 402 (1921); Steinberg, 225 B.R. at 655. 
62. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1994). Transfers made within one year of the 
bankruptcy filing can be avoided under Section 548 of the Code. Id. Transfers 
that were made more than one year pre-petition can be avoided under state law 
fraudulent conveyance statutes using the trustee's avoiding powers provided in 
11 u.s.c. § 544(b). 
63. Id. § 547. Transfers to outside creditors may be avoided if they were 
made within ninety days of the filing, whereas transfers to insiders may be 
18 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
payments to themselves before the bankruptcy filing can be forced to 
return those payments to the firm's bankruptcy estate64 if the firm 
ultimately files a bankruptcy petition. 65 
In addition to the uncertainty concerning the meaning of 
"insolvency," and the scope of directors' post-insolvency fiduciary 
duties, it is unclear whether the directors' fiduciary duties (however 
defined) to creditors replaces or is coextensive with a duty to 
shareholders. 66 Requiring directors to consider the interests of both 
avoided for a longer period of time, up to a year before the filing. Id. § 547(b)(4). 
64. The commencement of the case creates a bankruptcy estate that 
consists of the debtor's property wherever located. Id. § 541. 
65. The debtor-in-possession ("DIP") or Trustee can recover property that 
the firm improperly transferred to others, including directors, managers, or 
preferred creditors. If the firm transferred property directly to directors or the 
directors benefited from transfers of firm property to third-parties, the directors 
can be forced to return either the property or the value of the transferred 
property to the bankruptcy estate because the trustee has the right to recover a 
preferential transfer from either the actual transferee or the person who 
benefited from the transfer. Id. § 550. However, even if the director voluntarily 
made the transfer to a third-party, the DIP or Trustee is limited to recovering 
the fraudulently or preferentially transferred funds from the transferee/third-
party unless the director personally benefited from the transfer. 
66. Some courts believe that upon insolvency, directors and officers no 
longer represent the stockholders. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Sea Pines Co., 
692 F.2d 973, 977 (4th Cir. 1982); Hovis v. Powers Constr. Co. (In re Hoffman 
Assocs., Inc.), 194 B.R. 943, 964 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1995). Others believe directors 
have duties to both creditors and shareholders upon insolvency. See Sanford 
Fork & Tool Co. v. Howe, Brown and Co., 157 U.S. 312, 316-19 (1895); Ed Peters 
Jewelry Co. v. C & J Jewelry Co., 124 F.3d 252, 276 (1st Cir. 1997) (claiming 
directors owe a duty of loyalty to both shareholders and creditors after the firm 
is insolvent); Butler v. Bantz (In re Howe Grain, Inc.), 209 B.R. 496, 499 (Bankr. 
D. Neb. 1997); Value Prop. Trust v. Zim Co. (In re Mortgage & Realty Trust), 
195 B.R. 740, 750-51 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996); Comm. of the Creditors ofXonics 
Med. Sys., Inc. v. Haverty (In re Xonics, Inc.), 99 B.R. 870, 872 (Bankr. N.D. Ill 
1989). 
Some courts and commentators view creditors as the true "owners" of a 
bankruptcy firm, see Kham & Nate's Shoes No.2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 
1351, 1360 (7th Cir. 1990), and some academic scholars have argued that 
Chapter 11 should be used only to protect creditors' interests because they 
replace shareholders as the residual stakeholders upon a firm's insolvency. See, 
e.g., Barry E. Adler, A Theory of Corporate Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 343, 
362-63 (1997); Frost, supra note 50, at 114-15; see also Lin, supra note 50, at 
1512 (commenting that the fiduciary duties owed to creditors when a 
corporation is insolvent can arguably be construed broadly to maximize the 
creditor's interest or narrowly to merely require the equal treatment of 
creditors); LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 41, at 709 
(suggesting that managers should have fiduciary duties to both creditors and 
shareholders "until their claims or interests are extinguished"); David Arthur 
Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 
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shareholders and creditors potentially creates an irreconcilable 
conflict given the divergent interests shareholders and creditors 
have once the firm is either in the ''vicinity of insolvency'' or is 
insolvent. Because creditors are entitled to receive no more than the 
amount of debt owed them, they will want directors to avoid risky 
business decisions that might save the business, but if unsuccessful 
will likely dissipate the firm's remaining assets. They are not 
entitled to any "upside" in benefits the firm reaps from risky (but 
successful) actions and, thus, will prefer that directors avoid those 
risky activities even if high-risk activities may reap tremendous 
financial benefits for the firm. 67 In contrast, shareholders' interests 
in an insolvent firm are worthless because their interests will be 
paid only after all creditors have been paid. 66 Given this, 
shareholders have an incentive to encourage directors to engage in 
risky behavior to resuscitate the firm because they capture all the 
higher returns, but are protected on the downside because of their 
limited liability to the firm's creditors.69 
To some extent, directors already are required to consider dual 
interests as they are prohibited from making distributions to 
stockholders if doing so would render the corporation insolvent or 
leave it with unreasonably small capital.70 However, even if 
directors of insolvent or near-insolvent firms understand that they 
have a fiduciary duty to protect non-shareholder claims or interests, 
they also understand that even (perhaps especially) during a firm's 
insolvency, shareholders retain the right to compel annual meetings 
and vote to replace them as directors. 71 Though some scholars argue 
Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461, 500 (1992) (noting that "as the 
fortunes of a bankrupt firm rise or fall during the course of a chapter 11 case, 
the firm's residual owner could change" and remarking that it is unclear "when 
or how the decisionmaking class should be chosen"). 
67. See generally EASTERBOOK & FISCHEL, supra note 44, at 69; Schwarcz, 
supra note 57, at 666-67 (discussing the differences between the rights and 
incentives of shareholders and creditors of a solvent corporation). 
68. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations 
and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate 
Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 106-07 
(1984) (discussing conflicting interests of secured creditors, junior creditors, and 
shareholders). 
69. See Frost, supra note 50, at 106. 
70. See Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco, Int'l, Inc.), 208 B.R. 
288, 301 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (rejecting the argument that requiring 
directors to consider the interests of both groups creates irreconcilable conflict), 
affd in part, Comm'r of Revenue v. Brandt (In re Healthco Int'l, Inc.), 2001 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 15379 (D. Mass. July 8, 2001). 
71. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(k), 216(3), 223 (2001); see also Saxon 
Indus., Inc. v. NKFW Partners, 488 A.2d 1298, 1300 (Del. 1984). 
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that these are phantom "rights" for shareholders of public 
corporations (because management often controls the outcome of 
shareholder votes), 72 directors nonetheless may feel conflicting 
loyalties upon the firm's insolvency and current law does not clearly 
explain how directors could simultaneously protect those potentially 
conflicting interests. 73 
3. Conclusion 
Although directors have the authority to place a firm under the 
protection of federal bankruptcy laws, they have no explicit duty to 
either file a bankruptcy petition on behalf of an insolvent firm or 
refrain from filing one. Despite the ambiguity concerning the scope 
of directors' duties to creditors,74 no court has ever suggested that 
directors breach those duties by failing to file an early bankruptcy 
petition or that directors should be held liable for placing a DOA 
firm in bankruptcy. If directors are unrealistically optimistic about 
their ability to save the financially troubled firm, or they want to 
avoid the harm to shareholder (or their own) equity interests in the 
firm, existing legal rules give directors no incentive to protect the 
firm's community of interest by filing a bankruptcy petition sooner 
rather than later. With no clear duty to protect the interests of the 
72. See Blair & Stout, supra note 40, at 310-11; David Millon, New Game 
Plan or Business As Usual? A Critique of the Team Production Model of 
Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1018 (2000) ("[M]anagement determines 
the outcome of the annual election and typically gets its way on other 
shareholder votes too."). 
73. In Commodity Futures Trading Commission u. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 
343, 355 (1985), the Supreme Court noted that shareholder interests must be 
subordinated to creditor interests, but did not delineate the nature of the duties 
directors owed creditors. See also In re Cent. Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068, 
1072-73 (7th Cir. 1987) (agreeing that the debtor's primary duty was to ensure 
sufficient assets to pay creditor claims, but also considered the shareholders' 
interests in being paid). 
74. In addition to having potentially conflicting duties to creditors and 
shareholders, Trustees and DIPs potentially have intra-creditor conflicting 
duties during a bankruptcy case. Managers, who have an incentive to keep 
their jobs, will not want to dispose of a significant amount of the firm's assets 
even if the disposition might be in the best interest of the firm and its creditors. 
Thus, they are likely to give more favorable treatment to creditors who will not 
demand that they sell substantial portions of the firm or its assets. Similarly, 
managers have an incentive to favor creditors (like trade creditors or suppliers) 
who are likely to support keeping the firm intact (and retaining the current 
managers) even though the Trustee/DIP should treat all similarly-situated 
creditors alike. See Martin J. Bienenstock, Conflicts Between Management and 
the Debtor In Possession's Fiduciary Duties, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 543, 544-46 
(1992) (discussing incentives that affect managers' negotiations during Chapter 
11 reorganizations). 
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firm (and its constituents) upon insolvency, directors understand 
that they face little risk of liability if they harm the firm by their 
decision to file (or not to file) a bankruptcy petition for the firm. 75 
Current fiduciary duties give directors no incentives to avoid 
DOA filings. Creating additional liability for directors who fail to 
file timely bankruptcy petitions would not be warranted, however, if 
non-legal controls give directors an incentive to avoid DOA filings. 
As the next section demonstrates, however, existing market controls 
fail to give directors an incentive to file timely bankruptcy petitions. 
B. Market Restraints Fail to Curb Directors' Selflnterested 
Opportunistic Behavior 
In theory, existing market restraints (such as product markets, 
capital markets, and the market for corporate control) will contain 
directorial opportunistic acts and induce directors to make decisions 
(including avoiding DOA filings) that are in the best interests of the 
business. 76 Rational manager/directors would not consistently and 
intentionally make harmful business decisions because, according to 
75. Notwithstanding the general understanding that directors have 
fiduciary duties to creditors during the firm's bankruptcy proceeding and that 
they must pay creditor claims before distributing property to owners, directors' 
fiduciary duties during bankruptcy cases are murky as well. See, e.g., 
Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 355 (stating that the debtor-in-possession owes a 
fiduciary duty to stockholders, yet failing to explain how to reconcile this duty 
with the fiduciary duties owed creditors); Casco N. Bank v. DN Assocs. (In re 
DN Assocs.), 144 B.R. 195, 199 (Bankr. D. Me. 1992) (allowing counsel to be 
compensated from the bankruptcy estate despite the creditors' claim that 
counsel was working to advance interests adverse to the estate). Although the 
"absolute priority" rule requires that creditors be paid in full before equity, 
empirical research suggests that debtors can circumvent that requirement. See 
Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the 
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. 
REv. 125, 166-67 (1990). Moreover, despite the latest Supreme Court 
pronouncement on the absolute priority rule, it still remains possible that old 
equity can contribute new value to the reorganized firm and retain its equity 
position. See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 
526 U.S. 434, 454-58 (1999) (declining to decide whether the new value 
exception to the absolute priority rule exists, but holding that plans cannot 
grant equity interests for former owners if only old equity is allowed to propose 
a reorganization plan or compete for the equity). 
Indeed, recovering fraudulent or preferential transfers is probably the 
greatest risk directors face in their firms' bankruptcies. See generally Clarkson 
Co. v. Shaheen, 660 F.2d 506, 512-13 (2d Cir. 1981); Rosebud Corp. v. Boggio, 
561 P.2d 367, 372-73 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977) (director liable to creditor for not 
preventing officer-director from selling insolvent corporation and converting 
proceeds to himselfto the detriment of corporate creditor). 
76. See Cohen, supra note 25, at 352-53; LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate 
Governance, supra note 41, at 710-12; Rao et al., supra note 51, at 56. 
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the corporate control market theory, shareholders who are unhappy 
with those decisions will either sell their shares or call an annual 
meeting to replace them.77 In addition, directors who make decisions 
that consistently harm their firms will so weaken the firm that it 
will become an easy take-over target (which also might lead to their 
removal as directors). Directors (especially inside directors) also 
have an incentive to act only in the firm's best interest because, 
according to the labor market theory, being associated with a board 
of an insolvent or bankrupt firm will cause reputational harm and 
affect their future employment prospects. 78 Likewise, because the 
salary of inside directors often is based on the firm's profitability, 
directors have an incentive to avoid making decisions that cause the 
firm to become insolvent. 79 
Directors also have an incentive to make decisions that are in 
the best interest of the firm because of certain social status 
influences. Specifically, directors of successful firms often are 
recognized and commended in the popular press, often on a 
published list of the ''best" or ''worst" boards.80 Receiving positive 
recognition both enhances the director's self-esteem and also leads 
to potentially more lucrative social or professional opportunities. 
While directors of large businesses do not derive their principal 
income from director's fees, fees and benefits for serving on the 
boards of major companies can exceed one hundred thousand dollars 
annually.81 The risk of losing this income arguably causes directors 
77. In decisions involving breaches of the duty of care, courts imply that 
shareholders who object to a rational decision made by a director lack the right 
to sue the director for breach of the duty of care. Instead, their sole remedy is 
to elect other directors. In re Caremark, Int'l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 
1996). 
78. See Cohen, supra note 25, at 352. 
79. Id. 
80. Matthew Boyle, The Dirty Half-Dozen: America's Worst Boards, 
FORTUNE, May 14, 2001, at 249, 249; John A. Byrne, The Best and the Worst 
Boards, Bus. WK., Jan. 24, 2000, at 142, 142 (including a table of both the best 
and worst corporate boards); Louis Lavelle, The Best & Worst Boards: How the 
Corporate Scandals Are Sparking a Revolution in Governance, Bus. WK., Oct. 7, 
2002, at 104, 104. Ironically, in 2000, the Chief Executive magazine ranked 
Enron's board among the top five boards. Editorial, 'Yes Men' Make up Boards 
that Miss Enron-type Failings, USA TODAY, Feb. 21, 2002, at A16 [hereinafter 
Yes Men]. 
81. Enron directors were paid in excess of three to four hundred thousand 
dollars in cash and stock in 2001. Reed Abelson, Enron's Collapse: The 
Directors; One Inquiry Suggests Board Played Important Role, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
19, 2002, at C1 [hereinafter Abelson, Enron's Collapse]; Yes Men, supra note 80, 
at A16. Other firms had similar (sometimes significantly higher) compensation 
plans for their directors. See Gary Strauss, Corporate Perks Add Zing to Juicy 
Jobs on Boards: Free Products, Services Help Sweeten the Pot, USA TODAY, Apr. 
17, 2000, at B3 (reporting $645,700 annual fee to Microsoft directors, $386,320 
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to make decisions that will ensure that they remain on the current 
board and are asked to serve on future boards. 82 Thus, to the extent 
that directors value prestige and status, they will avoid making 
decisions that might embarrass them and harm their social esteem. 
For several reasons, market controls generally will not curb 
directorial misconduct-especially when firms face financial crises. 
First, market controls are inadequate controls because not all 
markets are efficient and information is not always transparent. 83 
Moreover, even if market controls discourage directors from making 
decisions that cause the firm's insolvency, the "final period" problem 
will make managers indifferent to market controls once the firm 
becomes insolvent. The final period problem arises when a person 
fears that she is about to lose her job and senses that she will be 
unable to secure equal or better employment.84 Once the firm 
becomes insolvent, the final period bias will give directors 
(especially inside directors) an incentive to engage in high-risk 
activities to save the firm since they may know (or at least suspect) 
that their future financial opportunities are limited. That is, inside 
directors of insolvent firms will want to delay filing a bankruptcy 
petition for the firm since most will know (or at least suspect) they 
will be replaced if the firm files for bankruptcy.85 Similarly, given 
the reputational harm that inside directors may suffer because of 
the public scrutiny of their conduct, they will seek to delay the filing 
if they believe they are unlikely to have future opportunities to serve 
as managers oflarge firms.86 
Since many outside directors are shareholders, they also will 
have an incentive to delay a filing if they suspect that their equity 
interests will be eliminated by a bankruptcy filing. Indeed, as the 
to Dell directors, and $341,900 to Goldman Sachs directors). 
82. Gary Strauss, Do Conflicts Cloud the Objectivity of Corporate Boards?; 
Critics Say Side Deals Can Compromise Watchdog Duties, USA TODAY, Mar. 5, 
2002, at Al. 
83. See, e.g., Dierdre A. Burgman & Paul N. Cox, Corporate Directors, 
Corporate Realities, and Deliberative Process: An Analysis of the Trans Union 
Case, 11 J. CORP. L. 311, 354-58 (1996); Cohen, supra note 25, at 352; Michael 
C. Jensen, Presidential Address: The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and 
the Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 851-53 (1985). 
84. Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing Is Coming 
to an End: The Case of Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REV. 675, 694 (1999). 
85. See infra note 86. 
86. For example, given the taint associated with them, one wonders what 
major corporation would be willing to hire Kenneth Lay (the now disgraced 
former Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") and Board Chair of Enron) or Andrew 
Fastow (Enron's former Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") who appeared to be the 
principal organizer and beneficiary of Enron's use of off-the-book accounting 
practices). 
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Enron case demonstrates,· directors' economic incentives to protect 
their own pecuniary interests (by, for example, exercising stock 
options and selling stock) will discourage them from filing a 
bankruptcy petition for the firm at least until after they have 
protected those interests. 57 If the short-term monetary gains from 
delaying a filing are great, directors will conclude that those gains 
are worth any potential reputational harm. 
Finally, some scholars suggest that increased director liability 
is unnecessary because directors typically make decisions that are in 
the firm's best interest because of corporate cultural norms of 
fairness and trust. 88 Directors who intentionally cause harm to 
businesses arguably will be "sanctioned" by feelings of guilt or 
shame, or will be shunned by their peers if they violate those 
cultural norms.89 While that may be true in some instances, given 
the potential of enormous profits (like those in the Enron case),90 it 
87. Enron's directors netted billions by strategically exerc1smg stock 
options then selling shares. The Enron directors' selling activities appear to 
have been triggered by the directors' knowledge that Enron was insolvent (and 
would need to be placed in bankruptcy), that their investments would be 
worthless in the subsequent bankruptcy, and that they might be forced to 
resign in the bankruptcy. See Michael Duffy, What Did They Know and ... 
When Did They Know It?, TIME, Jan. 28, 2002, at 16, 16. Specifically, from 1999 
through mid-2001, insiders received $1.1 billion by selling approximately 17.3 
million Enron shares. Leslie Wayne, Before Debacle, Enron Insiders Cashed in 
$1.1 Billion in Shares, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at Bl. During this period, a 
director and former Enron executive received almost eighty million dollars for 
1.4 million shares and another director sold one million shares for over seventy-
five million dollars. Id. Though claiming the sales were unrelated to Enron's 
growing financial problems, Lay personally sold 1.8 million shares between 
1999 and July 2001, and purportedly realized a gain of $123.4 million from 
exercising stock options in 2000. Peter Behr, Enron CEO Says No to $60.6 
Million, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2001, at E1; Floyd Norris & David Barboza, 
Enron's Many Strands: Ex-Chairman's Finances; Lay Sold Shares for $100 
Million, N.Y. TIMES, Feb 16, 2002, at A1; Wayne, supra, at Bl. Similarly, in 
August 2001 Lay sold a total of $16.1 million in Enron stock and Jeffrey 
Skilling (whom Lay replaced as president and Chief Executive Officer) netted 
$15.5 million from sales of stock. Duffy, supra, at 16. J. Clifford Baxter (a 
former Enron executive and vice-chair of the board who quit in 2001) cashed in 
thirty-five million dollars in stock options. Paul Duggan & Peter Behr, Ex-
Enron Executive Found Dead in Car; Police Say Gun, Note Point to Suicide, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2002, at Al. Baxter had expressed concerns about 
Enron's accounting practices and was considered a crucial witness by 
committees investigating Enron. Id. He committed suicide on January 25, 
2002. Id. 
88. Blair & Stout, supra note 40, at 316. 
89. David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 
1811, 1821 (2001). 
90. See supra note 81. 
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is questionable whether any norm will effectively prevent directors 
from taking (or refraining from taking) actions that harm the firm, if 
the financial benefit of betraying their firms substantially outweighs 
the costs associated with violating those norms.91 
It is likely that most directors will remain wedded both to their 
confidence about their ability to save a financially troubled firm and 
to their belief that their prior decisions remain valid. Neither 
existing legal rules and duties, nor market norms give directors an 
incentive to seek outside help or information to challenge their belief 
that they have the ability to save the firm from insolvency. Given 
this, a legal rule is needed to protect firms from overly confident 
directors. 
IV. PROPOSED LIABILITY FOR THE F AlLURE TO TIMELY FILE 
A Justifications for the Duty 
Imposing a penalty for failing to cede control of the firm to the 
bankruptcy court should discourage directors' overly optimistic 
decisions and, instead, encourage them to consider the realistic long-
term viability of the firm. As noted in the next section, imposing a 
duty to file a timely bankruptcy petition would help discourage 
systematically overconfident directors by forcing them to admit at a 
much earlier point that they cannot save the firm, that the firm 
cannot avoid insolvency, and that the firm should be placed under 
the protection of the bankruptcy court. 92 
1. A Clear Legal Rule Will Give Directors an Incentive to Seek 
Outside Advice 
As the Enron case illustrates, even financially sophisticated 
directors often fail to understand the strategic or financial risks 
facing their firms. 93 If directors believe that they made (or 
approved) the decisions that caused the firm's financial difficulties, 
they are unlikely to be willing to make a realistic appraisal of any 
91. See Blair & Stout, supra note 40, at 318-19 (questioning effectiveness of 
trust and integrity to prevent directors from behaving in opportunistic ways). 
92. See infra Parts IV.A.1-3. 
93. Enron's directors failed to prevent the accounting irregularities that 
ultimately led to the downfall of this firm notwithstanding the directors' 
impeccable credentials. Directors included Wendy Graham (former Chair of the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission and wife of Sen. Phil Gramm); Lord 
John Wakekkham (a former leader of the Houses of Commons and Lords); 
William C. Powers, Jr. (the Dean of the Texas Law School); Raymond S. 
Trougbh (a financial consultant); Robert K. Jaedicke (the former Dean of 
Stanford's Business School); and, Paulo Ferraz Pereira (a former bank 
president). Abelson, Enron's Collapse, supra note 81, at Cl. 
26 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
action that questions the wisdom of their prior decisions. Similarly, 
if directors are overconfident about their abilities to save the firm 
and are generally incapable of admitting that their past decisions 
are no longer in the best interests of the firm, only an external 
influence will convince them that drastic measures (including, 
potentially a bankruptcy filing) are needed to save the firm. 
Moreover, if the board is both overconfident and fairly cohesive, they 
are likely to engage in "groupthink"-an adaptive response where 
people tend to close ranks and cling to a collegial status quo when 
confronted with challenges to the group's solidarity.94 
Directors who suspect the firm is in the vicinity of insolvency, 
but are unsure whether the firm is actually insolvent, should seek 
the advice of external financial experts (like investment bankers or 
risk managers), or appoint a committee of the board that consists of 
completely independent directors who have financial management 
or accounting expertise. 95 Indeed, unless one of the directors has 
this specialized knowledge, a board would benefit from the services 
of an external expert who-in addition to forcing directors to 
reconsider their prior decisions-could provide a range of insolvency 
advice.96 Directors who know they have a duty to file a timely 
bankruptcy petition will be more likely to seek and rely on the 
advice of financial or turnaround experts (or to insist that a director 
with this type of expertise be added to the board). Knowing ex ante 
the potential liability they face if they fail to carefully monitor 
manager's actions will cause directors to be more critical of their 
prior decisions and will make them more likely to protect the firm's 
community of interests, not just their interest in convincing 
themselves that they can save the firm or that their prior decisions 
continue to be sound. Directors already seek the advice of 
94. Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 32. 
95. See Helen S. Scott, The SEC, the Audit Committee Rules, and the 
Marketplaces: Corporate Governance and the Future, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 549, 557-
66 (2001) (discussing proposed SEC regulations that require directors to 
maintain an audit committee composed of independent directors who are 
financially literate and have at least one member with management or 
accounting expertise). While Enron's board created a committee to examine 
Enron's relationship with the Fastow partnerships, the committee had inherent 
conflicts of interests as all members of the committee (except one) were involved 
with creating the partnerships or had already reviewed the transactions. See 
Abelson, Enron's Collapse, supra note 81, at Cl. 
96. This advice could include methods for restructuring operations, 
creating a new capital structure, helping to stem the flow of losses, engaging 
competent management or retraining existing managers, and helping the 
directors develop a feasible and profitable business plan. See, e.g., Ron. Conrad 
B. Duberstein, Out-of-court Workouts, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 347, 356 
(1993). 
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investment bankers when considering whether a merger or takeover 
is "fair" financially and they rely on that fairness opinion to avoid 
liability if sued for a breach of fiduciary duty.97 Similarly, it is not 
uncommon for companies who are seeking additional capital or are 
in merger discussions to obtain "solvency opinions."98 
Imposing a duty to timely file should also encourage directors to 
more closely monitor managers, especially managers who encourage 
them to approve risky or questionable practices. 99 The duty would 
encourage the directors of firms who are facing a financial crisis to 
carefully scrutinize all financial information they receive from 
officers, especially if the officers appear reluctant to provide full 
information. Officers, like directors, likely will be concerned about 
their reputation and may be more reluctant to accurately portray 
the firm's finances if they fear that an accurate portrait may 
jeopardize their compensation or tenure with the firm. Imposing 
liability on directors who fail to protect the firm from a DOA 
bankruptcy filing should help bridge the inherent information 
disparity between the firm officers and the board by giving them an 
incentive to demand that the firm's managers give them detailed 
financial information to help them ascertain the true nature of the 
firm's financial condition. 
Finally, as a practical matter, directors should routinely consult 
outside experts when managers ask them to approve irregular or 
suspicious financial reporting procedures like those used in 
Enron100~specially if they are financially unsophisticated and, 
97. See Helen M. Bowers, Fairness Opinions and the Business Judgment 
Rule: An Empirical Investigation of Target Firms' Use of Fairness Opinions, 96 
N.W.U. L. REV. 567, 569-70 (2002); William J. Carney, Fairness Opinions: How 
Fair Are They and Why We Should Do Nothing About It, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 523, 
525 (1992) ("It is more useful to think of fairness opinions as assuring the 
continued application of the business judgment rule during an era when it has 
been under severe attack."). 
98. See Bayer Corp. v. Mascotech, Inc. (In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc.), 269 
F.3d 726, 734 (6th Cir. 2001) (discussing "solvency opinion" that induced sale of 
half of the stock of a company); Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco 
Int'l, Inc.), 208 B.R. 288, 299 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (discussing "solvency 
letter" prepared by appraisal firm during merger discussions), affd in part, 
Comm'r of Revenue v. Brandt (In re Healthco Int'l, Inc.), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15379 (D. Mass. July 8, 2001). 
99. Directors are highly deferential toward the firm's officers and tend not 
to carefully monitor the officers unless there is some type of crisis. See, e.g., JAY 
W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF 
AMERICA's CORPORATE BOARDS 41-49 (1989). Directors are especially unlikely to 
conclude that the officers have engaged in misconduct if the directors selected 
or decided to retain the officers, since that concession necessarily would place 
some of the blame on the directors. See Langevoort, supra note 7, at 811. 
100. Of course, Enron's directors now contend that they approved of Enron's 
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thus, prone to engage in ''herd behavior" by deferring to 
management decisions. 101 Though the board should not be 
discouraged from having a trusting relationship with the firm's 
officers, 102 directors must avoid the groupthink phenomenon, since it 
will encourage politeness and courtesy but discourage necessary 
. ht103 overs1g . 
2. Creating an Explicit Duty to Timely File Will Clarify 
Directors' Fiduciary Obligations Once the Firm Is Insolvent 
Another benefit of imposing a duty to timely file is that it will 
help clarify directors' existing duties to firm constituents once the 
firm is insolvent. Imposing the duty to timely file is consistent with 
the communitarian view of the firm because it will clarify that 
directors must consider the interests of all firm constituents 
(creditors, shareholders, employees, etc.) upon the firm's 
insolvency. 104 While virtually all courts and academic commentators 
agree that Chapter 11 reorganizations are designed to benefit 
creditors, 105 many also believe that the debate about the efficiency or 
questionable accounting practices only because Enron's accounting firm, Arthur 
Andersen, failed to inform the board that the practices were improper. See 
Reed Abelson, Enron's Many Strands: The Directors; Enron's Board Quickly 
Ratified Far-Reaching Management Moues, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at C6 
[hereinafter Abelson, Enron's Board). It is quite likely that the directors will 
rely on this alleged misinformation to both defend against charges levied 
against them, and also to seek reimbursement from Andersen of any liability 
they incur. 
101. Another behavioral trait-herd behavior-causes decisionmakers to 
ignore their information or judgment and instead imitate the actions of others. 
Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 28 (discussing herd behavior in making board 
decisions). Given this tendency, it is probably best for directors to routinely 
seek external assistance when they are asked to approve unusual financial 
transactions. Doing so will avoid a future claim that the directors (especially 
the members of the audit committee) lacked competence to adequately consider 
the transaction. See Scott, supra note 95, at 564-65 (discussing criticisms of 
SEC rules concerning the qualifications of audit committee members). 
102. While it is unclear whether board friendships threaten board 
independence and pose harm to shareholder interests, it is clear that unduly 
adversarial relationships between boards and firm officers are 
counterproductive. See Langevoort, supra note 7, at 812-13. 
103. Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 32. 
104. See Susan Block-Lieb, The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy, 
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 503, 519-20 (2001) (arguing that bankruptcy rules should 
maximize collective welfare, not just the welfare of creditors because the 
debtor's financial distress affects creditors, shareholders, employees, and society 
overall). 
105. See Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of 
Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 732-39 (1991) (analyzing the distinction 
between bankruptcy law and other creditor remedies under non-bankruptcy law 
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purposes of business bankruptcies also should consider the interests 
of employees, trade suppliers, and the community surrounding the 
debtor. 106 As the Enron and WorldCom bankruptcies demonstrate, 
corporate defaults have a dramatic impact on employees, the 
debtor's business associates, and the local community.107 Thus, 
whether Chapter 11 normatively should protect the interests of 
anyone other than creditors, as a descriptive matter it is clear that 
business bankruptcies affect suppliers, taxing authorities, and 
others in the debtor's community. Having a clear duty avoids the 
uncertainties (and potential breach of duty litigation) resulting from 
the conflicting interests directors currently have because the duty 
will allow them to consider the firm's overall community of interests 
once the firm becomes insolvent.108 
3. The Duty to Timely File Will Lead to More Efficient Filings 
Finally, imposing a duty to timely place firms under the 
while accepting that the basic purpose of bankruptcy law is to re-allocate funds 
among creditors); Robert E. Scott, Through Bankruptcy with the Creditors' 
Bargain Heuristic, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 690, 700-08 (1986) (book review) 
(comparing the risk-sharing aspects of bankruptcy law and its affects on 
creditors to that of a captain's decision while in command of a sinking ship). 
106. Edward S. Adams, Governance in Chapter 11 Reorganizations: 
Reducing Costs, Improving Results, 73 B.U. L. REV. 581, 629-30 (1993) 
(discussing goals Congress intended to foster when it enacted Chapter 11, 
including protecting the investing public, protecting jobs, furthering overriding 
community goals and values); Symposium, What Constitutes Success in Chapter 
11?: A Roundtable Discussion, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 229, 233-37 (1994) 
(recognizing community impact as a Chapter 11 concern, but re-asserting that 
paying creditors is the main goal); Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence 
Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of Businesses in Bankruptcy, 73 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 499, 553 (1999) (noting Congress' keen awareness of how 
bankruptcy law may affect jobs and local communities). 
107. Filings for public companies are at especially high levels. In addition to 
the Enron and WorldCom filings, other recent large corporate filings include 
Kmart, USAirways, United Airlines, and Global Crossing. In 2001, 257 publicly 
traded companies (with $256 billion in assets) filed for bankruptcy, a forty-six 
percent increase in filings, the highest recorded since 1980, and more than 
double the annual filings in the last recession (ninety-one in 1992, and 125 in 
1991). Carter Pate, The Phoenix Forecast: Bankruptcies and Restructurings 
2002, 2-3 (Mar. 2002), at http://www.abiworld.org/researchlpwcreport.pdf. 
Recent empirical data suggest that potentially two million new employees 
annually may be employed by firms who file for bankruptcy. Warren & 
Westbrook, supra note 106, at 554. 
108. As one commentator has stated in discussing constituency statutes, in 
many instances directors seem to be "blindly groping to balance the conflicting 
interests" of shareholders and creditors with little guidance to determine how to 
respond to the duties they may have to those constituent groups. See Mitchell, 
supra note 46, at 589. 
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protection of bankruptcy laws should result in earlier, more efficient 
Chapter 7 liquidations, Chapter 11 reorganizations, or Chapter 11 
liquidations. 109 In general, Chapter 11 reorganizations are favored 
over liquidations because they give managers the possibility (even if 
remote) of restructuring the firm's finances or operations, thereby 
protecting employee jobs, paying creditors and producing a return 
for shareholders.110 Whether because oflocal culture,111 or a desire to 
take advantage of the delay allowed by a Chapter 11 filing, the vast 
majority oflarge firms (i.e. those with assets of$500,000) file first in 
Chapter 11 even if they have no realistic possibility of 
reorganizing.112 Thus, Chapter 11 appears to have assumed the role 
of the chapter of choice for large businesses who intend to either 
reorganize or liquidate.113 Even if firms that ultimately liquidate file 
109. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 233-34 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5963, 6193 ("One of the problems that the Bankruptcy Commission recognized 
in current bankruptcy and reorganization practice is that debtors too often wait 
too long to seek bankruptcy relief."). The Code allows firms to liquidate in 
either Chapter 7 or 11. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4) (1994). As an initial matter, 
encouraging earlier filings was one of the goals of Chapter 11. See H.R. REP. 
No. 95-595, at 220: 
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation 
case, is to restructure a business's finances so that it may continue to 
operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and 
produce a return for its stockholders. The premise of a business 
reorganization is that assets that are used for production in the 
industry for which they were designed are more valuable than those 
same assets sold for scrap. 
110. See Adams, supra note 106, at 610 (theorizing that most debtors in 
possession will favor Chapter 11 reorganization over Chapter 7 liquidation 
because "Chapter 11 provide[s] a corporate debtor with considerable latitude 
regarding its creditors," and "offers managers an opportunity to retain their 
jobs and orchestrate the reorganization"); Warren & Westbrook, supra note 106, 
at 501 (proposing that since "liquidation bankruptcy terminates the business, 
few businesses will file for Chapter 7 unless they have no hope of survival"). 
111. See Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, 
Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 503 (1993) (suggesting "that local 
administrative practices and legal culture have more effect on choices in 
consumer bankruptcy than do features of the law"). 
112. Warren & Westbrook, supra note 106, at 523. 
113. For example, Montgomery Ward's first Chapter 11 petition was filed in 
1997. Ultimately, it filed a Chapter 11liquidation in 2000. Leslie Kaufman & 
Claudia H. Deutsch, Montgomery Ward to Close Its Doors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 
2000, at Cl. Similarly, Service Merchandise operated under Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection since 1999. By 2002, however, the company decided to 
cease all business operations. Service Merchandise, A Retailer, To Close, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2002, at C4; see also Lynn M. Lopucki & William C. Whitford, 
Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 
78 CORNELL L. REv. 597, 601 (1993) [hereinafter Lopucki & Whitford, Patterns] 
(indicating that twelve percent of confirmed Chapter 11 plans are liquidations); 
Robert K. Rasmussen, The Efficiency of Chapter 11, 8 BANKR. DEV. J. 319, 322 
2003] ANALYZING CORPORATE FAILURES 31 
initially in Chapter 11, an earlier filing should better preserve the 
value of the finn and allow it either to be a more successful 
reorganization (which will benefit employees, trade creditors, 
suppliers, and the local community) or a more efficient liquidation 
that provides a higher return for creditors. 
While earlier filings ultimately should benefit the finn and its 
community of interests, a duty to timely file is neither risk-free nor 
cost-free. Bankruptcy proceedings-especially Chapter 11 
reorganizations-are routinely criticized for being inefficient, for 
benefiting only bankruptcy professionals and for having excessive 
indirect and direct costs.114 Imposing a duty to timely file arguably 
will cause directors to become overly risk averse and lead them to 
place solvent firms in bankruptcy. As an initial matter, it is worth 
noting that it is highly unlikely that a duty to timely file would 
cause a rational director of a completely solvent firm to place the 
firm in bankruptcy as business bankruptcy filings-especially for 
public companies-are rare.115 Business filings remain an 
insignificant percentage of total filings notwithstanding the recent 
increase in corporate defaults.116 Given the low filing rate, it 
(1991) (indicating that twenty to thirty percent of confirmed Chapter 11 plans 
are liquidation reorganizations). 
114. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPI'CY LAW 20-
27 (1986); Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 173, 185 (1987); Rasmussen, supra note 113, at 323 (discussing the 
efficiency of bankruptcy law and noting the "robust" academic debate on 
whether efficiency, rather than redistribution of wealth, should be the main 
goal of bankruptcy); Scott, supra note 105, at 700-07 (concluding that 
bankruptcy is animated by a "conflict between the maximization of insolvent 
debtors' assets and distributional equality among claimants"). 
115. REPORT, supra note 1, at 303 (business bankruptcy filings represent 
only four percent of overall filings). Since 1983, the annual filing rates for 
public companies have ranged from 1.34% to 0.54%. Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara 
D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New 
York: Empirical Evidence of a "Race to the Bottom," 54 VAND. L. REV. 231, 242 
(2001). Though bankruptcy filings for public companies have been the subject 
of much academic commentary, small business filings (not those of publicly-held 
companies) dominate Chapter 11. See Warren & Westbrook, supra note 106, at 
520, 550 (indicating that more than half of the business filers schedule less than 
$100,000 in assets and only fifteen percent have more than $500,000 in total 
assets as of filing and indicating that publicly traded cases were less than 
0.006% of all business filings). 
116. For example, despite the recent increase in business filings, business 
filings in both 2001 and 2002 were less than three percent of total bankruptcy 
filings. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Record Breaking Bankruptcy Filings 
Reported in Calendar Year 2001 (Feb. 19, 2002), at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
Press_Releases/cy01bk.pdf; Am. Bankr. Inst., U.S. Bankruptcy Filing Statistics, 
at http://www.abiworld.org/stats/currentstats.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2002); 
Am. Bankr. Inst., U.S. Bankruptcy Filings 1980-2002 (Business, Non-Business, 
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appears that even firms that face temporary financial setbacks can 
often be saved without the need to file for bankruptcy.117 
Even a slight increase in bankruptcy filings likely would be 
unacceptable to critics who contend that business reorganizations 
under Chapter 11 are "unsuccessful,"118 are substantially more 
expensive than market driven methods to resolve a firm's insolvency 
and fail to maximize the wealth or protect the owners' (i.e., the 
firm's creditors) state law entitlements to be paid pursuant to the 
Total), at http://www.abiworld.org/stats/1980annual.html (last visited Feb. 28, 
2003). 
117. See Tabas v. Greenleaf Ventures, Inc. (In re Flagship Healthcare, Inc.), 
269 B.R. 721, 728 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2001) ("In the world of corporate workouts, 
turnaround managers and the possibility for a quick change in an economic 
tide, it is not uncommon for a corporation to revitalize itself and work out 
financial problems no matter how dire they appear."). 
118. There is no clear definition of a "successful" Chapter 11 case. Some 
commentators define success as a confirmed reorganization plan, while others 
view the case as successful only if the firm either does not file a subsequent 
Chapter 11 petition or does not ultimately liquidate (either within or outside 
bankruptcy). See Lopucki & Whitford, Patterns, supra note 113, at 599-600 
(chronicling lawyer and commentator definitions of "success"); see also Lynn M. 
Lopucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code? (First Installment), 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 100 (1983) 
(indicating success rate of twenty-six percent); Rasmussen, supra note 113, at 
322 (indicating confirmation rate of seventeen to thirty percent); REPORT, supra 
note 1, at 308 (noting general lack of data, but citing statistics that suggest that 
Chapter 11 plans are confirmed in less than a third of all cases); What 
Constitutes Success in Chapter 11? A Roundtable Discussion, supra note 106, at 
240-45 (discussing different views of what may constitute a Chapter 11 
success). While smaller businesses confirm bankruptcy plans in less than thirty 
percent of all cases, the success rate for large, publicly-traded firms is estimated 
to be much higher. See Edward I. Altman, Evaluating the Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy-Reorganization Process, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 5 (1993) 
(estimating that almost forty-eight percent of publicly-owned companies had a 
plan confirmed); LoPucki & Whitford, Patterns, supra note 113, at 600-01 
(citing studies that show that the Chapter 11 plan confirmation rate is low 
because most Chapter 11 cases involve smaller companies); Elizabeth Warren, 
The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J. 437, 443 (1992) 
(suggesting that ninety percent of large, publicly-traded firms confirm a plan). 
Recent empirical evidence suggests that Chapter 11 filings in Delaware 
are less "successful" than filings in other states as evidenced by the purportedly 
higher refiling rates for companies who filed there. See LoPucki & Kalin, supra 
note 115, at 254-60 (analyzing why Delaware refiling rates are higher than 
optimal). But see Robert Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Whither the Race? 
A Comment on the Effects of the Delawarization of Corporate Reorganizations, 
54 VAND. L. REV. 283, 285-86 (2001) (arguing against Lopucki and Kalin's 
assessment of Delaware's failure rate for Chapter 11 based on refilings because 
there may be "an optimal, non-zero amount of refilings"). 
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terms of the firm's contracts with them. 119 Part of the controversy 
concerning the inefficiency of Chapter 11 reorganizations is the 
relatively high failure rate. Empirical data suggest, however, that 
many Chapter 11 reorganizations (and out-of-court workouts) are 
unsuccessful because firms enter bankruptcy reorganizations too 
highly leveraged and, in many instances, fail to sufficiently reduce 
debt in the reorganization. 120 While imposing the duty to file may 
cause some directors to prematurely file bankruptcy petitions for 
financially distressed (yet not insolvent) firms, firms that are not 
over-leveraged or otherwise hopelessly insolvent have a better 
chance of emerging from a Chapter 11 reorganization with fewer 
debts and paying a greater percentage of creditors claims in either a 
bankruptcy liquidation or reorganization. 
119. Some critics suggest that, rather than reorgamzmg firms under 
Chapter 11, a firm's assets should be auctioned as a going concern shortly after 
the bankruptcy filing. See Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11, 
36 J.L. & ECON. 633, 647 (1993) (arguing that an immediate auction should be 
as beneficial as a long search for different buyers of assets); Douglas G. Baird, 
The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 128 
(1986) (theorizing that reorganization will rarely be more optimal than 
liquidation); Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate 
Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 531 (1983) (suggesting that market-
based mechanisms are a possibility for cheaper and quicker reorganizations). 
Others argue that Chapter 11 should be replaced with a system that removes 
existing shareholders upon default and gives creditors the option to purchase 
shares of the reorganized debtor. See Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political 
Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 319 (1993) 
(offering proposed market remedies to bankruptcy that give creditors priority 
thereby eliminating prolonged negotiation and litigation expenses); Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARv. L. REV. 
775, 785-86 (1988) (devising a model that divides interests between levels of 
creditors). Finally, some propose that debtors be allowed to waive their right to 
file for bankruptcy, or that Chapter 11 be abolished in favor of allowing 
creditors to exercise their state law collection remedies. See James W. Bowers, 
Whither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Theory, and the 
Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L. REV. 27, 69 (1991) 
(asserting that debtors may be just as efficient liquidators and distributors 
under non-bankruptcy creditor remedies in the absence of bankruptcy law); 
Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate 
Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 99 (1992) (proposing that allowing state law to 
handle resource allocation and the elimination of federal bankruptcy law would 
increase efficiency); Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts, 
36 J.L. & ECON. 595, 599 (1993) (arguing that parties should be able to waive 
bankruptcy process in favor of debt contracts). 
120. See LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 115, at 262, 265 (theorizing that 
Delaware's bankruptcy courts' approach may not sufficiently induce firms to 
reduce their leverage ratios); Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 118, at 300 
(suggesting that insufficient debt reduction will fail to alleviate financial 
distress). 
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Moreover, it is simply unrealistic to assume that imposing a 
duty to timely file (even if the duty increases the overall number of 
filings) will dramatically increase insolvency costs. Though there 
are direce21 and indirect costs122 associated with bankruptcy 
proceedings, firms who experience financial distress will incur many 
of these costs even if they do not file for bankruptcy. Once a firm 
experiences financial distress, its creditors will increase their 
monitoring costs and the firm will incur costs to negotiate (or 
renegotiate) its debts with those creditors. 123 Likewise, financially 
distressed firms who may be forced to incur costs to participate in 
out-of-court restructurings, may need to eliminate or curtail 
business operations, and the firm may be harmed if their credit 
ratings are lowered once they default on debt repayment. 124 Indeed, 
even if Chapter 11 is unsuccessful (however defined), empirical data 
indicate that out-of-court restructurings may be even more 
expensive than a bankruptcy filing, may have even higher failure 
121. Direct costs are the transaction costs of the bankruptcy case, primarily 
lawyer, accountant, and other professional fees. Adams, supra note 106, at 607. 
Direct costs appear to be considerably less than earlier suspected. See Stephen 
J. Lubben, The Direct Costs of Corporate Reorganization: An Empirical 
Examination of Professional Fees in Large Chapter 11 Cases, 74 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 509, 515 (2000) (concluding that direct costs in large reorganizations are 
approximately two percent of firm assets); Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy 
Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 
285, 286 (1990) (placing costs at three percent of assets). 
122. See Adams, supra note 106, at 608. Estimates of these direct and 
indirect costs vary widely. See Edward I. Altman, A Further Empirical 
Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question, 39 J. FIN. 1067, 1077-78 (1984); 
James S. Ang et al., The Administrative Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: A Note, 
37 J. FIN. 219, 224-25 (1982); Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Costs of Inefficient 
Bargaining and Financial Distress: Evidence from Corporate Lawsuits, 35 J. 
FIN. ECON. 221, 242 (1994); David M. Cutler & Lawrence H. Summers, The 
Costs of Conflict Resolution and Financial Distress: Evidence from the Texaco-
Pennzoil Litigation, 19 RAND J. EcoN. 157, 167-68 (1988) (theorizing that 
indirect costs were responsible for Texaco's decline in value); Stuart C. Gilson et 
al., Troubled Debt Restructurings: An Empirical Study of Private 
Reorganization of Firms in Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 315, 335-38 (1990); Jerold 
B. Warner, Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence, 32 J. FIN. 337, 338 (1977); Weiss, 
supra note 121, at 289; Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy Costs and the New 
Bankruptcy Code, 38 J. FIN. 477,483-84 (1983). 
123. Block-Lieb, supra note 104, at 556-57 (arguing that eliminating the 
bankruptcy system will not eliminate all enforcement costs); Rasmussen & 
Thomas, supra note 118, at 294 (characterizing financial distress as "costly" and 
describing a financially distressed firm's indirect costs outside of bankruptcy). 
124. In general, a credit rating reflects the rating company's opinion of a 
firm's capacity to pay its commitments on a timely basis. See Leo Brand, 
Corporate Defaults: Will Things Get Worse Before They Get Better, STANDARD & 
POOR'S CREDITWEEK, Jan. 31, 2001, at 16, 16. 
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rates, and, moreover, are often followed by a Chapter 7 filing. 125 
A duty to timely file should respond to one of the biggest 
criticisms of Chapter 11, i.e., the improper role managers play before 
and during the firm's bankruptcy. Some commentators argue that 
the debtor-in-possession model adopted by Chapter 11 is flawed 
because director-managers almost always retain control over the 
debtor and will strategically prolong the lives of hopelessly insolvent 
firms simply to extend their tenure as executives.126 These critics 
maintain that Chapter 11 is viewed as a ''way-station in a journey 
toward liquidation"127 and that managers seek relief in a 
reorganization proceeding (or in serial proceedings)128 simply to 
preserve their jobs.129 To Chapter 11 critics, neither shareholders, 
creditors, nor employees benefit from Chapter 11 reorganizations; 
125. See generally Stuart C. Gilson, Transactions Costs and Capital 
Structure Choice: Evidence from Financially Distressed Firms, 52 J. FIN. 161 
(1997) (examining the transaction costs of out-of-court workouts); Gilson et al., 
supra note 122 (examining the success rates of out-of-court restructurings). 
126. Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for 
Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1044-45 (1992). 
127. Baird & Jackson, supra note 68, at 126. 
128. There have been a number of highly-publicized serial business 
bankruptcy filings. For example, TWA filed its first bankruptcy petition in 
1992, its second in 1995, and its third in January 2001. Cynthia Wilson, The 
History of TWA, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 2, 2001, at A10. The third filing 
was used to consummate a sale of the firm to American Airlines. I d. Similarly, 
Phar-Mor, Inc., filed for Chapter 11 protection in 1992 after allegations that its 
senior managers embezzled funds from the corporation then overstated 
earnings. Don Shilling, Corporate Scandal, Rise of Larger Chains Doom Once-
Promising Phar-Mor, VINDICATOR (Youngstown, OH), Jul. 19, 2002. Though it 
emerged from Chapter 11 in 1995, it filed again in September 2001 and will be 
liquidated. See Phar-Mor, Drugstore Chain, Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 25, 2001, at C2; Shilling, supra (discussing sale of company's assets); see 
also Altman, supra note 122, at 6 (commenting that a "non-trivial" number of 
emerged Chapter 11's refile); Edith Shwalb Hotchkiss, Postbankruptcy 
Performance and Management Turnover, 50 J. FIN. 3, 4, 7 (1995) ("Thirty-two 
percent of the sample firms are involved in a second bankruptcy or distressed 
restructuring."); LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 115, at 235 n.16 (2001) 
(commenting on the high rates of bankruptcy refilings); Lopucki & Whitford, 
Patterns, supra note 113, at 609 (characterizing refiling rates as 
"extraordinarily high"); James D. Key, Comment, The Advent of the Serial 
Chapter 11 Filing and Its Implications, 8 BANKR. DEV. J. 245, 255-58 (1991) 
(discussing serial Chapter 11 filings). 
129. See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, supra note 68, at 126 (contending that delay 
gives managers a strategic advantage over creditors). Likewise, critics contend 
that bankruptcy laws give managers the incentive to transfer wealth from 
creditors to equity holders and, by allowing the managers to remain in control 
of the debtor, allow them to overstate expected net cash flows, understate risks, 
and generally prevent creditors from being able to protect their interests during 
the bankruptcy proceeding. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 126, at 1052-53. 
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only corporate managers, lawyers, and bankruptcy consultants 
benefit. 130 
While managers may have a career interest in preserving the 
firm, 131 empirical data indicate that, as a practical matter, Chapter 
11 will not allow them to accomplish that. 132 Empirical data suggest 
that in most instances key managers or directors are either replaced 
or voluntarily leave within two years following the filing of a 
Chapter 11 petition and often have gloomy prospects for future 
employment in large firms in a managerial role.133 Though the 
recent practice adopted by some bankruptcy courts of allowing the 
debtor to pay key employees pre-petition or post-petition "retention" 
incentives or bonuses suggest that these managers are valuable to 
the firm at least in the initial stages, 134 directors and managers most 
130. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 126, at 1073. 
131. LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 41, at 685 
(recognizing that Chapter 11 reorganization may be the "only means of 
salvaging" the careers and reputations of managers). 
132. Id. at 723-24 (finding that there was a change in CEOs of large, 
corporate debtors in ninety-one percent of the cases studied); LoPucki & 
Whitford, Patterns, supra note 113, at 610 (discussing rapid turnover of 
corporate managers in Chapter 11 reorganizations of publicly held companies); 
Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks and Blockholders: Evidence on 
Changes in Corporate Ownership and Control When Firms Default, 27 J. FIN. 
EcoN. 355 (1990) [hereinafter Gilson, Blockholders]; Stuart C. Gilson, 
Management Turnover and Financial Distress, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 241 (1989) 
[hereinafter Gilson, Management Turnover]; Warren, supra note 118, at 449 
(finding that seventy-one percent of managers of firms filing for bankruptcy lost 
their jobs). 
133. LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 41, at 723-24; 
LoPucki & Whitford, Patterns, supra note 113, at 610; Gilson, Blockholders, 
supra note 132; Gilson, Management Turnover, supra note 132; Warren, supra 
note 118, at 449. 
134. Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Kurt Eichenwald, Enron Paid $55 Million For 
Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2001, at Cl. The practice of paying huge sums to 
key employees of debtor firms is not uncommon. Large business debtors argue 
that they must give retention, or "pay to stay" bonuses to mission-critical 
employees to prevent them from abandoning the firm during the thankless 
phase of rebuilding or dismantling an ailing enterprise. See Bethlehem Asks to 
Give $9 Million in Bonuses; Bankruptcy Judge Gets Plan, PLAIN DEALER 
(Cleveland), Dec. 29, 2001, at C1 (discussing retention bonuses for Bethlehem 
Steel Corp. and LTV Corp. executives); Nancy Rivera Brooks, Enron Execs Were 
Paid to Remain, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, at B3 (contrasting average $110,000 
retention bonus to average $4500 severance pay to lower level workers and 
discussing retention bonuses for PG&E Corp.'s key managers); Ann Davis, 
Want Some Extra Cash? File for Chapter 11, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2001, at C1; 
Enron Asks Court for Another Round of Retention Bonuses, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 
2002, at C6 (reporting that Enron petitioned the court to approve a third round 
of bonuses worth $130 million to key employees); Jeff St. Onge, Bankruptcy 
Judge OKs WorldCom Bonuses; $25M Intended to Help Retain Key Staff, THE 
RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Oct. 30, 2002, at B1 (reporting that a 
2003] ANALYZING CORPORATE FAILURES 37 
likely understand that they will be replaced if their firms are placed 
in bankruptcy. Given this, they have every incentive to delay the 
filing to preserve their jobs. 
Creditors' interests during the bankruptcy case already have 
some protection from managers' opportunistic behavior because the 
bankruptcy court oversees many of the decisions managers make 
during the firm's bankruptcy proceeding and creditors have the 
right to curtail some of management's decision-making authority135 
or to replace managers or require that they be supervised.136 Even 
bankruptcy judge approved twenty-five million dollars in retention bonuses for 
WorldCom key executives over the objections of creditors); Nelson D. Schwartz 
et al., Greed-Mart; Attention Kmart Investors. The Company May Be Bankrupt, 
But Its Top Brass Have Been Raking It In, FORTUNE, Oct. 14, 2002, at 139, 139 
(reporting Kmart's use of over two million dollars in "inducement payments" 
and incentives to top executives); Speedo Maker Asks Bankruptcy Judge to 
Approve Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2001, at C6 (discussing retention bonuses 
for key employees of Warnaco Group (the maker of Calvin Klein jeans and 
Speedo swimwear)); Chris Woodyard & Martin Kasindorf, Enron Execs Pocket 
Big Bonuses, USA TODAY, Feb. 1, 2002, at Bl. 
Legislation recently was proposed to recover excessive funds paid to 
officers and directors both before and after a bankruptcy filing. See Employee 
Abuse Prevention Act of2002, H.R. 5221, 107th Cong. (2002). 
135. For example, creditors who are unhappy with management's 
governance decisions can move to dismiss the case or convert it to a Chapter 7 
liquidation. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1994). In addition, debtors are required to 
negotiate with the creditors' committee to get the plan confirmed and creditors 
can move to terminate the debtor's exclusive right to propose a plan. Id. 
§ 1102(a)(1) (requiring of creditor committee); id. § 1121(c) (granting creditors' 
committee the right to terminate exclusivity). Though 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) 
requires that a creditors' committee be appointed, in practice they generally are 
not appointed in small business filings. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 50, at 104, 
113 (1998). Moreover, courts can use informal procedures like increased 
monitoring, mediating, status conferences, expedited procedures and the threat 
of reduced counsel fees to curtail managers' authority. See Ron. A. Thomas 
Small, Small Business Bankruptcy Cases, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 305, 307 
(1993) (discussing fast track procedures used in the Eastern District of North 
Carolina). These creditors' rights tend to have little value in smaller Chapter 
11 cases where unsecured creditors tend not to participate because of the small 
stakes involved. 
136. In most Chapter 11 cases, a Trustee is not appointed and the debtor 
continues to operate the firm as a debtor-in-possession ("DIP"). The DIP has 
the same rights, powers, and duties given to a Trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a). It 
is quite likely that the DIP in a Chapter 11 reorganization will be reluctant to 
pursue claims against the directors, since the managers of a Chapter 11 debtor 
almost always are the same managers who operated the firm pre-petition. In 
cases where the DIP unjustifiably refuses to bring an avoidance action, the 
unsecured creditors' committee can seek leave from the court to pursue the 
claims on behalf of the DIP. See La. World Exposition v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Co., 
858 F.2d 233, 248 (5th Cir. 1988); see also In re Perkins, 902 F.2d 1254, 1258 
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imposing a duty to timely file will not prevent managers from 
continuing to retain some benefits from Chapter 11 filings. 
Likewise, imposing the duty to timely file may not prevent director-
managers from using Chapter 11 to delay their inevitable 
termination. However, requiring directors to file earlier ultimately 
should cause creditors to receive a higher percentage of recovery on 
their claims, should lead to more successful reorganizations, and 
might even allow shareholders to retain some of their interests in 
the reorganized business. 137 Managers will have less of an 
opportunity to waste corporate assets pre-filing if directors ensure 
that firms file for bankruptcy at an earlier date. Finally, it is worth 
noting that even if(l) the duty to timely file increases the number of 
corporate bankruptcy filings and (2) Chapter 11 is not perfect, as a 
practical reality, it has proven to be better than the existing 
alternatives. 138 
Before discussing proposed elements for the duty to timely file, 
the next section briefly addresses the likely criticisms of any 
proposal to increase directors' liability. 
B. Potential Unintended Consequences of a Duty to Timely File 
1. Imposing Liability May Have a Chilling Effect on Directors 
The most compelling reason not to impose a duty to timely file is 
the risk that the duty will cause directors to either refuse board 
service or make them overly cautious.139 Risk-averse actors would 
(7th Cir. 1990). Moreover, in particularly egregious cases, creditors who are 
unhappy with management's governance decisions can move to have a Chapter 
11 trustee appointed to replace managers or to have an examiner oversee 
aspects of the case. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a). Again, it is likely that these rights will 
be exercised only in larger business filings. 
137. Indeed, if the bankruptcy reorganization is a "success" and creditors are 
generally happy with the performance of the firm's management team during 
bankruptcy, current managers are more likely to be allowed to remain with the 
firm. 
138. See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World: A 
Reply to Professors Bradley and Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L. REV. 79, 107-09 (1992); 
Warren, supra note 118, at 477-78. Indeed, one critic of Chapter 11 has 
concluded that Chapter 11 must in fact be efficient, or else it would not have 
survived. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. 
FIN. ECON. 411, 413 (1990). 
139. During the height of the D&O insurance crisis in the mid-1980s, 
several news reports indicated that directors resigned due to lack of insurance. 
See 2 DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 2174 nn.1837-39 (1998). Unfortunately, limited 
empirical data substantiates this. See generally Cohen, supra note 25, at 352-
53 (citing paper that suggests that directors in Australia make decisions in the 
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rationally take excessive precautions and avoid risky decisions. 
Similarly, though directors tend to be well-educated, if they are not 
lawyers, they may overestimate the likelihood of their liability 
exposure and may make conservative decisions to ensure they 
comply with the legal rules.140 Directors, who tend to hold 
prominent positions with other companies, often respond to legal 
interventions to avoid being subjected to prolonged litigation.141 
Thus, even if a director suspects that she would not be held liable for 
violating a duty, she will act with caution to avoid the delays 
associated with litigation and the exposure of potentially 
embarrassing facts. Similar arguments concerning the potential of 
skewing director decision-making were raised when it appeared that 
states were poised to increase potential director liability for breach 
of care lawsuits142 and when the Securities and Exchange 
Commission proposed additional disclosure requirements for audit 
committees.143 
To be sure, firms need managers and directors who are willing 
to take reasonable risks because risks are an essential condition for 
promoting and advancing corporate profits. Moreover, a proposal 
that imposed liability on all directors of all firms that file for 
bankruptcy or that exposed directors (especially outside directors) to 
unlimited or massive liability would most certainly cause some 
qualified individuals to refuse to serve as directors of corporate 
boards.144 If, however, directors could predict ex ante the likely 
shadow of their potential personal liability); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The 
Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 
62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 459-60 (1993) (arguing for courts to apply a lower 
standard of review in liability cases to avoid over-deterring directors); Rao et 
al., supra note 51, at 57-60 (suggesting that directors who believe "they will not 
be liable for good faith mistakes in judgment will be significantly less risk-
averse than those who fear they may be held accountable for taking a risk that 
turns out badly," and citing survey that indicated that directors considered the 
potential for liability when deciding whether to serve as directors); Shaffer, 
supra note 51, at 555; Tamar Lewin, Director Insurance Drying Up, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 7, 1986, at D1 (citing a survey by a management research firm that 
indicated an overwhelming number of chief executives stated they would 
decrease the number of directorships they accepted because of the fear of 
increased liability). 
140. See Cohen, supra note 25, at 353; Rao et al., supra note 51, at 58-59. 
141. See Langevoort, supra note 7, at 823. 
142. See, e.g., Park McGinty, The Twilight of Fiduciary Duties: On the Need 
for Shareholder Self-Help in an Age of Formalistic Proceduralism, 46 EMORY 
L.J. 163, 173-77 (1997). 
143. Gregory S. Rowland, Earnings Management, the SEC, and Corporate 
Governance: Director Liability Arising from the Audit Committee Report, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 168, 202 n.144 (2002). 
144. Corporations and their directors reacted so swiftly (and negatively) to 
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amount of liability they face if they fail to protect the firm by timely 
filing a bankruptcy petition, and if the duty included a modest safe 
harbor provision to give the directors an additional period of time to 
comply with the duty, no rational director should either refuse to 
serve or provide overly cautious service. 
2. A Duty to Timely File Will Increase Director and Officer 
Liability Insurance Costs 
Exposing directors to greater liability may also have the 
unintended result of increasing the firm's director and officer 
liability insurance costs. D&O policies serve two primary functions. 
First, directors are entitled to seek direct payment under the policy 
("liability coverage") if the firm does not (or cannot) fully reimburse 
or indemnifY them for litigation expenses relating to their duties as 
directors of the firm. 145 D&O coverage also insures the firm for any 
expenses it incurs if it has to indemnify directors for wrongful acts, 
errors, omissions, or breaches of duty. 146 D&O policies can also 
insure firms against claims against the firm that are not otherwise 
covered ("entity coverage").147 
D&O insurance policies are costly, increased in the mid-1980s 
due to an overall increase in the number of bankruptcies, mergers, 
acquisitions, hostile takeovers, and public offerings, and appear to 
have skyrocketed as a result of the recent accounting scandals. 148 
Though costly, firms treat D&O coverage as a cost of doing business 
because they know they will lose qualified directors if they fail to 
Smith because it imposed potentially unlimited liability. The actual personal 
liability of the directors in that case purportedly was $23.5 million. ROBERT W. 
HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 
727 (4th ed. 1990). 
145. Palmore, supra note 48, at 105-06. Firms may be prevented under 
applicable state law from indemnifying directors who breach the duty of good 
faith or loyalty. Id. at 106-07. If the firm is statutorily prevented from 
indemnifying the director, the director would then seek reimbursement directly 
from the insurer. Id. at 108-09. 
146. See George Ong, Directors and Officers Insurance Proceeds in 
Bankruptcy: The Impact on an Estate and its Claimants, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 235, 
239 (1996). 
147. Alstrin v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 376, 396 (D. Del. 
2002). The policy in this case was limited to claims filed against the firm for 
violations of federal securities laws. 
148. See Ong, supra note 148, at 235 n.3; Palmore, supra note 48, at 104 
n.18; Roberta Romano, What Went Wrong with Directors' and Officers' Liability 
Insurance?, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 13-14 (1989); Christopher Oster, Directors' 
Insurance Fees Get Fatter: Paying More for Less Coverage Occurs as Fewer 
Insurers Retain Appetite for Liability Business, WALL ST. J., Jul. 12, 2002, at Cl. 
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provide this coverage.149 It is especially likely that outside directors 
would resign if D&O insurance is not provided, since they are not 
employed by the debtor firm and thus have less of an incentive to 
give beneficial advice or assistance to the firm. 150 While D&O 
premiums likely would increase if there is a duty to timely file, the 
risk to insurers and costs to firms should be modest as long as the 
duty is carefully defined and limited. That is, the risk to directors 
(and, thus insurers) imposed by breaching the duty to timely file 
should not significantly increase the firm's insurance costs as long 
as directors (and, thus insurers) can reasonably anticipate both 
when directors are likely to be fined and the amount of that fine. 
In theory, the availability of insurance will remove any 
incentive for directors to file earlier petitions. That is, if directors 
understand that they face no true liability, they may be unwilling to 
change their views. This is unlikely to occur for several reasons. 
First, while it is reasonable to assume that directors who intend to 
harm the firm will refuse to change their behavior even in the face 
of an increased risk of liability, this assumption is not a reasonable 
one for directors who fail to file timely petitions based on an 
unrealistic (but good faith) belief in their ability to save a firm. 
Moreover, directors are likely to attempt to comply with changes in 
the law to avoid the risk of litigation~ven if they think that their 
decisions are justified under existing law.151 Thus, a director who is 
attempting to act in the firm's best interest will seek the opinion of 
external, independent experts if he knows that he faces enhanced 
liability for failing to ensure the continued financial feasibility of a 
firm. If the expert opines that the firm cannot be saved absent 
drastic measures (including, perhaps, a bankruptcy filing), no 
reasonable director will continue to adhere to his belief that he (and 
the board) can save the firm. Finally, academic literature suggests 
that changes in the law often lead to changes in norms.152 Given 
this, increasing directors' legal liability is likely to influence their 
behavioral rules and standards (including whether to increase their 
149. It appears that several corporations lost directors in the mid-1980s 
when their D&O insurance lapsed. See Rao et al., supra note 51, at 58-59; 
Laurie Baum, The Job Nobody Wants, Bus. WK., Sept. 8, 1986, at 56, 56-57; 
Lewin, supra note 139, at Dl. 
150. See Bienenstock, supra note 74, at 545 (suggesting that independent 
directors are likely to resign if they are major shareholders and assume their 
equity positions will be eliminated during the bankruptcy or if D&O insurance 
lapses). 
151. See Langevoort, supra note 7, at 823. 
152. See generally Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of 
Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1619, 1641-53 (2001). 
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reliance on outside insolvency opinions) because changing the law 
governing directors' duties to a firm will affect the norm-based 
corporate culture.153 
The next section of this Article presents a model for a duty to 
timely file and explains why a carefully crafted duty like the one 
represented in this model will not harm the firm and will, instead, 
give directors an incentive to act in the firm's best interest. 
C. Elements of the Duty 
1. Establishing Liability 
To overcome behavioral tendencies that might cause directors to 
delay placing the firm under the protection of federal bankruptcy 
laws, the duty to timely file should require directors to file a 
bankruptcy petition within thirty days after the time they knew or 
reasonably should have known that the firm was insolvent. 
Providing a thirty day safe harbor gives the directors time while the 
firm is in (or approaching) the ''vicinity of insolvency'' and during a 
short time period following insolvency to determine whether they 
need to place the firm in bankruptcy (and avoid liability) or quickly 
initiate a plan to turnaround the firm's financial crisis (thus, 
avoiding the need to file for bankruptcy). 154 Liability should not be 
based on the date of the actual knowledge of insolvency for two main 
reasons. First, basing liability on actual knowledge will allow 
directors to avoid learning that a firm is approaching insolvency. 
Moreover, if most directors fail to file timely petitions because of the 
behavioral tendency to be overoptimistic, liability based on actual 
knowledge will not force directors to seek outside advice to 
determine whether the firm can be saved outside of bankruptcy. 
Insolvency should have a fairly precise definition so directors 
will know ex ante when they potentially face liability. Thus, 
insolvency should be defined as the time when directors knew or 
should have known that the firm would be unable to pay its 
153. Id. 
154. In addition, creating a safe harbor should decrease the number of 
preferential transfers made before and during the ninety day window. 
Currently, directors have an incentive to delay a bankruptcy filing if they know 
that they made preferential or fraudulent transfers to themselves or favored 
creditors. While the Trustee or DIP can recover some preferential transfers, the 
recovery period is limited to either ninety days before the filing (for transfers to 
non-insider creditors), or one year (for insider creditors). 11 U.S.C. § 54 7 
(1994). Directors who suspect their firms are in the vicinity of insolvency have 
an incentive to delay filing the petition to make sure the ninety day preference 
window "closes," thus preventing the Trustee/DIP from recovering the transfer 
from a favored creditor. 
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probable liabilities on its existing debts when they mature, or 
directors knew (or should have known) that the firm's liabilities 
exceed the fair market value of the firm's current tangible assets.155 
To avoid such characterizations of insolvency, when evaluating 
whether directors have failed to file timely, intangible property 
should not be included as an asset and courts should be allowed to 
consider evidence other than that listed on the debtor's schedules. 
These objective insolvency tests (unlike the indeterminate ''vicinity 
of insolvency'' test) give greater predictability to directors because 
they give directors a readily ascertainable point to determine when 
their fiduciary ·duties shift from one firm constituent (i.e., 
shareholders) to the firm's community of interests. 
Though some commentators have suggested that there is no 
objective criteria to determine insolvency156 and it may not be 
possible to determine insolvency with mathematical precision in all 
cases, it is simply unrealistic to assume that the firm's managers 
consistently will be able to successfully mislead directors who are 
attempting to be informed about the firm's finances. That is, just as 
the Enron board sought advice when asked to consider the proposal 
to use partnerships to hide Enron debt, 157 it is likely that directors 
155. Debtors may not accurately state assets and debts on their bankruptcy 
schedules (as evidenced by the Enron schedules that indicate that company was 
balance sheet solvent). See Internet Bankruptcy Library (July 22, 2002), at 
http://www.bankrupt.com/enron.txt. Likewise, WorldCom's bankruptcy 
schedules listed $103 billion in assets and forty-three billion dollars in debt, 
though more than fifty billion dollars of the assets were intangible. See 
Internet Bankruptcy Library (July 22, 2002), at http://www.bankrupt.com/ 
WorldCom.txt. Indeed, the Business Bankruptcy Project, a recent large-scale 
study of all types of business bankruptcies, indicates that twenty-five percent of 
business debtors claim to be balance sheet solvent and, among businesses in 
Chapter 11 and 13, the proportion rises to more than one in three. Warren & 
Westbrook, supra note 106, at 536-37. Fifty-five percent of the Chapter 11 
cases with assets over $500,000 claimed to be solvent, versus twenty-one 
percent of those with assets of less than $500,000. Id. at 540. The data does 
not indicate whether businesses inflated the value of their assets to reassure 
creditors (and thus were actually balance sheet insolvent) or whether the 
businesses were equitably insolvent even if not balance sheet insolvent. Id. at 
539. 
156. See, e.g., Stephen R. McDonnell, Greyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co.: 
Insolvency Shifts Directors' Burden From Shareholders to Creditors, 19 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 177, 206 (1994); Barbara Franklin, Directors' Duties: Insolvency Shifts 
Burden From Shareholder to Creditor, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 6, 1992, at 5, 5 
(suggesting that determining when a firm is insolvent is a tough task that 
requires expensive expert opinions). 
157. Enron's board appeared to have received detailed briefings about the 
purpose and structure of the Fastow partnerships and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission's concerns about the quality of Enron's financial 
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will be told (or will discover) that the firm has (or soon will have) 
financial obligations that could render it insolvent.158 If the board 
knows that the firm is experiencing financial difficulties and is 
asked to permit the firm to engage in a questionable (though 
arguably legal) financial transaction to preserve the appearance of 
the firm's solvency/59 the board should at least know that the firm is 
in the vicinity of insolvency. If the board chooses to approve of a 
questionable financial practice, it would do so knowing that it faces 
liability if the firm is currently insolvent and the maneuver fails to 
prevent the firm from filing for bankruptcy.160 Finally, it is 
unrealistic to suggest that directors are incapable of determining 
statements at least two years before the bankruptcy filing. See Abelson, 
Enron's Board, supra note 100, at C6. In addition, Enron's law firm, Vinson & 
Elkins, stated that Enron's accounting practices (though-they opined-not 
illegal) could embarrass the company and cause litigation. Peter Behr & April 
Witt, Concerns Grow Amid Conflicts; Officials Seek to Limit Probe, Fallout of 
Deals, WASH. POST, July 30, 2002, at Al. The law firm's advice raises questions 
of conflicts of interest, too. Because the firm had advised Enron about the use 
of the partnerships in the late 1990s, it arguably should not have given Enron 
advice about the continued legality of those partnerships. I d. 
158. As a practical matter, firms either intentionally or unintentionally 
signal when they are in financial distress. Typical signals that a firm is 
experiencing financial distress are the refusal of creditors to extend credit on 
favorable (or any) terms; the departure of key employees; an erosion of the 
firm's goods/services; a decrease in inventory or a delay in the firm's ability to 
place orders; a delay in the release of financial statements; or, at the latter 
stages, a rating agency downgrade or the issuance of an auditor's going concern 
or qualified opinion letter. When directors see those "red flags," they should be 
on notice that the firm is either in the vicinity of insolvency or is insolvent. 
159. This is exactly what Enron did when it asked its directors to approve 
the Fastow partnerships. Despite what appeared to be a direct conflict of 
interest, the board waived Enron's conflict-of-interest rules in June and October 
of 1999 to permit Fastow to oversee the partnerships while remaining Enron's 
CFO. Abelson, Enron's Collapse, supra note 81, at C1; see Kathleen Day & 
Peter Behr, Enron Directors Backed Moving Debt Off Books, WASH. POST, Jan. 
31, 2002, at Al. This waiver ultimately permitted Fastow to earn 
approximately thirty million dollars running the partnerships and hold a 
controlling interest in most of them. Day & Behr, supra, at Al. Of course, 
individual Enron directors had their own conflicts, as many of them earned 
huge consulting fees from Enron, worked for non-profits that were funded by 
Enron, were members of the boards of firms who were major Enron 
shareholders, or worked for companies that had significant business 
transactions with Enron. See, e.g., Christopher H. Schmitt, One Cozy Bunch: As 
Enron Fell, Even Its Outside Board Members Had Become Insiders, U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REP., Feb. 11, 2002, at 28, 28; Yes Men, supra note 80, at A16 
(reporting that one director earned almost $500,000 in consulting fees). 
160. To encourage directors to carefully monitor the firm's solvency, they 
should not be entitled to rely on the business judgment rule and instead should 
be subject to liability for simple negligence. 
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whether a firm is insolvent, since they already have a duty to cease 
distributions to stockholders if doing so would render the firm 
insolvent or leave it with insufficient working capital.161 
This duty arguably forces directors to consider a bankruptcy 
filing even before the firm is in the ''vicinity of insolvency." If 
directors are required to file a petition within thirty days of 
insolvency, they necessarily will need to seek outside insolvency 
advice (or themselves conduct an additional internal insolvency 
analysis) at a much earlier period. Though directors would have a 
relatively short time period in which to decide whether to place the 
firm under bankruptcy protection, bankruptcy laws already deem 
the firm's insiders to have knowledge of the firm's potential 
insolvency up to a year before the filing. 162 Moreover, because it is 
likely that a firm that is approaching insolvency will be in default on 
its credit obligations and will otherwise signal that it is facing a 
financial crisis, the thirty days is not unreasonable. Thus, unless 
the firm suffered an unexpected financial setback, directors will 
have known for considerably more than thirty days that a firm is 
having a financial crisis and that drastic steps might need to be 
taken to save the firm. Finally, there are benefits to having 
directors file after the firm has encountered a financial crisis-but 
before the firm is actually insolvent-since earlier filings increase 
the possibility that shareholders' interest in the firm will be at least 
partially preserved.163 
161. REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§ 8.33 (1985). 
162. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1994) allows the bankruptcy trustee to avoid 
preferential payments made up to one year before the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition if the transfer is to an insider. In contrast, transfers to non-insiders 
can be avoided only if they are made within ninety days of the bankruptcy 
filing. Id. § 547(b)(4)(A). 
The directors of Enron knew that using the Fastow partnerships to hide 
Enron's debts allowed Enron to significantly overstate earnings for several 
years. They also knew several months before the filing that allowing Enron's 
CFO to oversee the partnerships was at best questionable, as they ultimately 
suspended Enron's conflict of interest rules to allow him to remain in this dual 
capacity. Moreover, the Enron directors-especially the insiders-engaged in 
numerous acts (selling stock, exercising stock options, paying themselves 
retention bonuses) well before the filing that personally benefited themselves, 
but harmed employees and general creditors. See Oppel & Eichenwald, supra 
note 134, at C1 (reporting that days before bankruptcy filing, Enron paid 500 
key employees $55 million in "retention incentives"). 
163. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority 
Rights, and the Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. 
REV. 921, 952-54 (2001) (questioning the appropriate time for wiping out the 
equity interest of shareholders). 
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2. Establishing the Arrwunt of Liability 
The fine imposed for breaching the duty to timely file should be 
an amount equal to three times the highest directors' fee paid, or the 
value of the property given in lieu of a fee, in the three years before 
the filing. 164 Tying the sanction to the directors' fee in effect requires 
directors to reimburse the firm for their failure to act in the best 
interest of the firm by filing a timely bankruptcy petition. The fine 
should be based on a three-year period to prevent directors from 
strategically causing themselves to receive relatively small 
compensation in the filing year.165 Trebling is needed to ensure that 
· the sanction is high enough to cause directors to overcome their 
natural tendencies to avoid admitting that the firm cannot be 
salvaged. Trebling also serves as a liability cap which allows 
directors (and potentially the firm's insurer) to calculate ex ante the 
extent of potential liability if they choose not to place an insolvent 
firm under the protection of federal bankruptcy laws. 
Though directors of larger firms often receive sizeable director's 
fees, 166 most outside directors tend to be highly compensated officers 
of other corporations and thus serve on boards for non-financial 
reasons, including prestige and the contacts they make with other 
outside directors. 167 Proposing a significantly higher fee or one that 
does not relate to money or property the directors received from the 
firm would be unwise because that likely would overdeter and 
164. This Article does not specifically consider the amount of damages that 
should be assessed against directors of firms that do not pay fees. These 
directors also should face a sanction to avoid having firms pay their directors in 
forms other than cash to avoid liability for breaching the duty to timely file. If 
firms choose to pay their directors in stock or stock options, the fine should be 
three times the value of the stock when the directors either sell it or when they 
have the first opportunity to sell it. If directors receive no form of compensation 
for serving as directors, the fine could be based on other objective criteria such 
as, for example, some percentage of the difference between the unexplained and 
unaccounted for discrepancies between the assets listed in the bankruptcy 
schedules and those listed on the firm's most recent financial statement 
prepared for an outside lender. 
165. In addition, directors should be subject to the fine even if they waive 
their right to receive a director's fee. 
166. Enron directors were paid in excess of $300,000-$400,000 in cash and 
stock in 2001. Yes Men, supra note 80, at A16; see Abelson, Enron's Collapse, 
supra note 81, at Cl. Other firms had similar (sometimes significantly higher) 
compensation plans for their directors. See Gary Strauss, Corporate Perks Add 
Zing to Juicy Jobs on Boards Free Products, Services Help Sweeten the Pot, USA 
TODAY, Apr. 17, 2000, at B3 (reporting $645,700 annual fee to Microsoft 
directors, $386,320 to Dell directors, and $341,900 to Goldman Sachs directors). 
167. See Eisenberg, supra note 25, at 970-71 (discussing the nonfinancial 
benefits outside directors receive in addition to the directors' fee). 
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discourage too many qualified and competent directors from serving 
on corporate boards. Because so few firms actually file bankruptcy 
petitions, and the proposed duty to timely file gives directors a 
thirty-day safe harbor, this sanction should not cause rational 
directors to refuse to serve or make overly cautious decisions. 
Since this proposal would be imposed only if the firm is placed 
under the protection of federal bankruptcy laws, directors of firms 
that are liquidated outside of bankruptcy (for example, in a state 
receivership) would not face treble damages. Adopting such a model 
arguably could lead to unwanted forum shopping. In general, 
directors' obligations to firms should not turn on whether the 
insolvent firm files a bankruptcy petition or dissolves under state 
law. 168 While it is possible that the prospect of a fine in bankruptcy 
might cause some directors to allow their firms to be liquidated 
outside of bankruptcy, this result is unlikely for several reasons. 
While directors generally control whether the firm files for 
bankruptcy, and most Chapter 11 filings are voluntary petitions, as 
one noted academic commentator has observed: bankruptcy filings 
are rarely truly voluntary.169 Instead, firms most often are placed in 
bankruptcy typically after an institutional lender with a security 
interest in all the firm's assets threatens to exercise its state law 
remedies to seize them, the IRS threatens to levy on a firm's assets, 
or an unsecured creditor attempts to obtain a security interest in the 
debtor's assets. 170 Moreover, creditors always have the right to file 
an involuntary bankruptcy petition if the firm appears insolvent and 
is not paying its debts when due.171 Finally, while directors have 
somewhat ambiguous fiduciary duties to creditors when the firm 
becomes insolvent, directors who intentionally let a firm 
deteriorate-rather than declare bankruptcy for the firm-to avoid 
being fined for failing to file timely most likely would be deemed to 
have violated both the duty of care and duty of loyalty they owe 
shareholders and the fiduciary duties (however defined) they owe 
creditors.172 
168. See Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and 
Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 822 (1987) (arguing that 
the resolution of debts should not change based on whether a bankruptcy court 
or non-bankruptcy form resolves the dispute). 
169. See Douglas G. Baird, The Reorganization of Closely Held Firms and 
the "Opt Out" Problem, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 913, 926-27 (1994). 
170. Id.; see also William C. Whitford, What's Right about Chapter 11, 72 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1379, 1388-89 (1994) (discussing reason that Baldwin-United 
filed a liquidating Chapter 11). 
171. See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1994). 
172. See St. James Capital Corp. v. Pallet Recycling Assocs. of N. Am., Inc., 
589 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that while directors of 
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3. Collecting the Fine 
Only the debtor-in-possession ("DIP") or Trustee (or a creditors' 
committee acting on their behalf) should be allowed to sue the 
directors and any fine assessed should be payable to the Estate, not 
individual creditors.173 Giving only one entity standing to sue and 
making the fine payable only to the debtor should eliminate the 
most common concerns raised when proposals are made to increase 
director liability. That is, allowing the DIP or Trustee to sue 
directors would not expose directors to a large number of unfounded 
claims filed by multiple creditors' counsel, who arguably would have 
an incentive to file potentially groundless claims on behalf of their 
individual claims.174 Likewise, since the claim can be filed only in 
the firm's bankruptcy case, allowing the DIP or Trustee to assert 
this claim will not overwhelm the courts, there will not be a 
dramatic increase in administrative costs (because there will be only 
one claim), nor will there be a risk of inconsistent results. 175 Since 
only the firm's bankruptcy estate would be entitled to receive the 
fine for the failure to file timely, directors need not fear being sued 
later by shareholders or creditors in a derivative capacity. Plus, 
directors who remain on the board of the debtor firm would be 
required to defend only one claim, which should not prevent them 
from functioning as corporate directors. 
Trustees should not, however, be limited to collecting the fine 
just from the directors (who might either be unwilling or unable to 
pay it). If the firm purchases third-party insurance, the Trustee 
should also be allowed to seek payment of the directors' fines from 
the insurer.176 Just as Trustees would look to the D&O policy for 
insolvent firms have limited duties to creditors, they cannot simply walk away 
and allow the corporate assets to waste to the creditors' detriment). 
173. Trustees already have standing to file breach of fiduciary duty claims 
against the current or former directors of debtor companies. See, e.g., Brandt v. 
Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco Int'l, Inc.), 208 B.R. 288, 300 (Bankr. D. 
Mass 1997) (holding that a bankruptcy Trustee has standing to sue directors, 
lawyers, and accountants for breach of their fiduciary duties of loyalty and 
care), affd in part, Comm'r of Revenue v. Brandt (In re Healthco Int'l, Inc.), 
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15379 CD. Mass. July 8, 2001). 
17 4. See Creditors' Derivative Suits on Behalf of Solvent Corporations, 88 
YALE L.J. 1299, 1315-17 (1979) (suggesting that expanding creditors' rights to 
sue the directors of solvent corporations creates the possibility of an increase in 
groundless claims filed by attorneys who seek contingent fees from settlement 
and the risk of predatory litigation by competitors who obtain a claim against 
the corporation merely to file suit). 
175. See McDonnell, supra note 156, at 208 (suggesting, with no evidentiary 
support, "that multiple creditors will assert competing claims against the 
directors alleging a breach of fiduciary duties"); Franklin, supra note 156, at 6. 
176. If there is an "insured vs. insured" exclusion in the liability policy, the 
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payment, however, directors might also seek to pay the fine from the 
insurance proceeds. Whether they should be allowed to do so would 
depend on whether paying their claims would harm the debtor firm. 
If the proceeds are not property of the debtor firm's estate, the 
insurer could pay the claims and the debtor would not be harmed. 177 
insurer might argue that neither the DIP nor the Trustee can sue directors, 
since both parties arguably would be insureds under the policy. Insurers 
exclude insured versus insured claims from coverage based principally on the 
desire to avoid collusive claims by the firm against its directors and to prevent 
the firm from treating the liability policy as an errors or omissions policy. See 
Gray v. Executive Risk Indem., Inc. (In re Molten Metal Tech., Inc.), 271 B.R. 
711, 728 (Bankr. D. Mass 2002). Because both the Trustee and DIP are 
separate legal entities from the pre-petition firm, and because in many cases 
the Trustee acts as an adversary party to the debtor's officers and directors, it is 
questionable whether such an exclusion would apply. See id. at 728-29 
(concluding that an insurance company could not decline coverage based on the 
insured vs. insured exclusion against the Chapter 11 Trustee both because of 
the literal language of the policy and also because the Trustee is not the legal 
equivalent of the debtor); Rieser v. Baudendistel (In re Buckeye Countrymark, 
Inc.), 251 B.R. 835, 840 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2000) (finding that the bankruptcy 
trustee is a "separate legal entity that neither represents the Debtor nor owes 
the Debtor a fiduciary obligation"). 
177. Most courts generally conclude that the D&O policy itself is property of 
a debtor's estate. SeeFeld v. Zale Corp. (In re Zale Corp.), 62 F.3d 746, 757-59 
(5th Cir. 1995); Minoco Group of Cos. v. First State Underwriters Agency of 
New England Reinsurance Corp. (In re Minoco Group of Cos.), 799 F.2d 517, 
518 (9th Cir. 1986). While some courts have concluded that proceeds are 
property of the estate, others have concluded that proceeds are excluded from 
the estate. For cases holding that proceeds are property of the estate, see Ochs 
v. Lipson (In re First Cent. Fin. Corp.), 238 B.R. 9, 17 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999) 
("It may well be that proceeds of certain D & 0 insurance policies, which 
provide direct entity coverage to a corporate debtor, can be considered property 
of the estate." (quoting Homsy v. Floyd (In re Vitek, Inc.), 51 F.3d 530, 535 (5th 
Cir. 1995))); Int'l Heritage, Inc. v. Gilbert (In re Int'l Heritage, Inc.), 239 B.R. 
306, 311 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1999); In re Sacred Heart Hosp., 182 B.R. 413, 421 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995); Circle K Corp. v. Marks (In re Circle K Corp.), 121 B.R. 
257, 260 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1990); and, Johns-Manville Corp. v. Asbestos Litig. 
Group (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 26 B.R. 420, 434 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
Those concluding that proceeds are not property of the estate include La. World 
Exposition, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co. (In re La. World Exposition, Inc.), 832 F.2d 
1391, 1401 (5th Cir. 1987); Pintlar Corp. v. Fid. and Cas. Co. (In re Pintlar 
Corp.), 175 B.R. 379, 385 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1994), rev'd by 124 F.3d 1310 (9th 
Cir. 1997); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. of 
Technical Equities Corp. (In re Technical Equities Corp.), 163 B.R. 350, 354, 358 
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1993); In re Daisy Sys. Sec. Litig., 132 B.R. 752, 755 (N.D. 
Cal. 1991); and, Helfand v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295, 310 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992). For a broader discussion about whether D&O liability 
insurance is property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate, see Nan Roberts Eitel, 
Now You Have It, Now You Don't: Directors' and Officers' Insurance After a 
Corporate Bankruptcy, 46 LOY. L. REV. 585 (2000). 
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If the proceeds are property of the estate and directors are not 
allowed to seek payment from those proceeds, they arguably could 
file an indemnification claim against the firm seeking to be 
reimbursed for the fine. 178 
Even if such a claim is filed, the firm ultimately should not be 
harmed as the claim would be a pre-petition unsecured claim in the 
firm's bankruptcy179 which would be paid along with all other 
general unsecured claims.180 In addition, to protect general 
unsecured claims from having to share pro rata with the directors, 
courts could rely on principles of equitable subordination181 to 
further ensure that they are not harmed by payment of the 
178. Because the aggregate total amount of coverage under a D&O policy 
often includes the limits payable both to the firm (as indemnification or entity 
coverage) and its directors (for liability), payments made to directors may 
reduce the firm's potential coverage. Ochs, 238 B.R. at 13. That is, because 
payments typically are made on a first-come, first-served basis, if the directors' 
liability claims equal the amount of the cap, the insurance company would not 
be required to pay any of the firm's indemnification or entity coverage claims. 
See id. 
179. The claim would be a pre-petition claim because the directors' breach 
and the firm's obligation to insure the directors occurred pre-petition. See 
Christian Life Ctr. Litig. Def. Comm. v. Silva (In re Christian Life Ctr.), 821 
F.2d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 43 B.R. 443, 454 
(S.D. Ohio 1984). 
180. In re Amfesco Indus., Inc., 81 B.R. 777, 786 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988). 
The indemnification claim could be paid before all other unsecured claims only 
if it is viewed as an administrative expense in the firm's bankruptcy. 
Administrative expenses are those claims that are "actual, necessary costs and 
expenses of preserving the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1994). Though at 
least one court has suggested that a bankruptcy court has the discretion to give 
administrative priority to directors' litigation expense claims arising from a pre-
petition claim, in general, directors' indemnification claims should receive this 
priority treatment only if the court concludes that retaining the directors is 
essential for the preservation of the bankruptcy estate. See In re Baldwin-
United Corp., 43 B.R. at 462 ("[O]nly if the estate has or will benefit from the 
individual's services should administrative priority lie."). 
181. There may be some instances where creditors would be harmed if the 
directors' fine were paid pro rata with their general unsecured claims and, in 
that case, the court should consider subordinating the directors' claims. Courts 
can equitably subordinate claims pursuant to section 510(c) of the Bankruptcy 
Code for reasons of equity and fairness if a creditor has engaged in some type of 
misconduct associated with the claim it is asserting in the bankruptcy case. See 
11 U.S. C. § 510(c). The doctrine of equitable subordination was established in 
Pepper u. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939), and further developed in the courts 
as a policy against fraud and the breach of fiduciary duties. Though equitably 
subordinating claims causes the subordinated claim to be paid after other 
claims (not to disallow it), most debtors lack sufficient assets to pay all general 
unsecured claims in full. Thus, subordinating the directors' indemnification 
claims will in most cases mean that the claims will not be paid. 
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directors' fine. 182 Courts often cite a breach of a fiduciary duty as 
conduct that justifies equitably subordinating a claim183 and will find 
inequitable conduct when a fiduciary misuses his position to the 
disadvantage of other creditors or when a third party uses his 
position to the disadvantage of other creditors. 184 Given this, 
subordinating the indemnification claims of directors who fail to file 
a timely bankruptcy petition should be warranted in almost all 
cases.
185 
182. Even if a creditor's misconduct is not illegal or does not give rise to legal 
liability, courts can subordinate a claim if there is proof that the claimant 
engaged in some type of inequitable conduct that resulted in injury to the 
creditors or conferred an unfair advantage. to the claimant, or if allowing the 
creditor to claim a pro rata share in the bankruptcy estate would unfairly harm 
other creditors. Stoubmos v. Kilimnik, 988 F.2d 949, 958 (9th Cir. 1993); 
Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 700 (5th Cir. 1977); 
Allied E. States Maint. Corp. v. Miller (In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc.), 108 B.R. 
831, 834 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1988). 
183. Estes v. N & D Props., Inc. (In re N & D Props., Inc.), 799 F.2d 726, 732 
(11th Cir. 1986) ("Appellee's behavior while in control indicates that she was 
acting solely for her own benefit, to minimize her risk of loss without any 
consideration for other creditors. Such pursuit of personal gain at the expense 
of other creditors has been recognized as a breach of fiduciary duty justifying 
equitable subordination." (citing Bergquist v. First Nat'l Bank of St. Paul (In re 
Am. Lumber Co.); 7 B.R. 519, 528-29 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1979))); Cosoff v. 
Rodman (In re W.T. Grant Co.), 699 F.2d 599, 610-11 (2d Cir. 1983); Liberty 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Leroy Holding Co. (In re Fort Ann Express, Inc.), 226 B.R. 746, 
755 (N.D.N.Y. 1998); Freytag v. Am. Fed. Bank, F.S.B. (In re Freytag), 155 B.R. 
150, 157 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993) (citing Fabricators, Inc. v. Technical 
Fabricators, Inc. (In re Fabricators, Inc.), 926 F.2d 1458, 1467 (5th Cir. 1991)); 
In re Delta Smelting & Ref. Alaska, Inc., 53 B.R. 877, 885 (Bankr. D. Alaska 
1985) (noting "before a bankruptcy court may disallow or subordinate a claim, 
some basis must exist of the sort traditionally cognizable by equity as justifying 
its intervention, such as fraud, breach of fiduciary duties, mismanagement, [or) 
overreaching" (quoting Stebbins v. Crocker Citizens Nat'l Bank (In re 
Ahlswede), 516 F.2d 784, 788 (9th Cir. 1975))). 
184. Capitol Bank & Trust Co. v. 604 Columbus Ave. Realty Trust (In re 604 
Columbus Ave. Realty Trust), 968 F.2d 1332, 1353, 1359-60 (1st Cir. 1992) 
("The doctrine [of equitable subordination) permits a bankruptcy court to 
rearrange the priorities of creditors' interests, and to place all or part of the 
wrongdoer's claim in an inferior status."); Allied E. States Maint. Corp., 108 
B.R. at 836 n.3 (finding that absent equitable subordination, "[t)he cumulative 
effect of the [directors'] conduct would be to elevate them to a secured status by 
which they would be made whole to the extent of the value of the assets of the 
estate, while at the same time depriving unsecured creditors of their pro rata 
share"). 
185. Because all directors have a duty to creditors once the firm becomes 
insolvent, failing to protect those interests by filing a timely bankruptcy 
petition arguably would warrant subordinating all directors' claims, not just 
those of the inside directors. However, a claim of a truly independent outside 
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4. Defenses to Breach of Duty 
Truly independent directors who rely in good faith on the advice 
rendered by independent financial advisors (who themselves must 
lack a conflict of interest with the firm)186 should have at least a 
qualified defense to a claim that they breached the duty to timely 
file. 187 Though directors should not be required to seek outside 
advice to avoid breaching the duty to timely file, directors likely will 
conclude that it is in their best interests to seek-then follow-
advice provided by truly independent financial experts who have no 
actual or perceived conflict of interest. Directors who learn from 
either internal or external financial experts that the firm is 
approaching insolvency or is already insolvent can use the expert's 
advice, protect the firm, and place the firm under the protection of 
the bankruptcy court. Conversely, directors who seek external 
advice and either disagree with the advice or conclude that they can 
resuscitate the firm outside of bankruptcy can rationally choose not 
to place the firm in a bankruptcy proceeding (with full knowledge of 
their potential liability if the firm subsequently files). 
If the expert opines that the firm is not insolvent but that 
opinion is an erroneous one, directors should have the right to sue 
the expert to recover any damages they must pay for breaching the 
director should not be subordinated if the director can establish by board 
minutes that he voted in favor of a timely bankruptcy filing but was outvoted. 
In that case, the outvoted director should be allowed to assert his unsecured 
claim with all other unsecured claims. At least with respect to the Enron 
directors, it is unclear how many of the purportedly outside directors were truly 
independent, given their consulting and other pecuniary relationships with 
Enron. See Abelson, Enron's Collapse, supra note 81, at Cl. 
186. See In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., Litig., 634 A.2d 319, 323 (Del. 1993) 
(noting the "questionable reliability" of a financial advisor's opinion where the 
financial advisor, at the time it gave a fairness opinion to the firm regarding a 
business combination, was party to an agreement with that firm which provided 
for the advisor to continue to provide investment banking services to the firm 
and the combined entity). 
187. Because directors have a duty to become reasonably confident about the 
veracity of opinions, reports, or other forms of outside advice before making 
decisions in reliance on that advice and must actively oversee the expert's work, 
they should have only a qualified defense to a breach of duty claim. Mills 
Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1283-84 (Del. 1989); REVISED 
MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 8.30(e) (1985). Given the superior knowledge the 
firm's inside directors possess, they generally should not be allowed to assert a 
qualified defense, especially if they failed to disclose information to the other 
members of the board or the boards' external experts and if the withheld 
information would have alerted either the board or the external experts of the 
firm's insolvency. Cf Graham v. Taylor Capital Group, Inc. (In re Reliance Sec. 
Litig.), 135 F. Supp. 2d 480, 502-03 (D. Del. 2001) (discussing liability of outside 
directors under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act). 
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duty to timely file unless the directors waived this right in the 
expert's engagement agreement.188 Moreover, directors also should 
be allowed to rely on the expert financial advice as a defense if the 
DIP or Trustee seeks to subordinate their indemnification claims.189 
V. CONCLUSION 
Current legal rules fail to respond to behavioral tendencies that 
cause directors to refuse to relinquish exclusive control of the firm 
by placing it under the protection of the bankruptcy court. Chapter 
11 reorganizations are designed to either preserve the ongoing-
concern value of firms or efficiently liquidate them. Encouraging 
earlier filings should increase the likelihood that the firm can 
successfully reorganize, should decrease the likelihood that the firm 
will need to file serial bankruptcy petitions, and should yield greater 
benefits for the firm's community of interests (including creditors, 
188. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2001). This would be consistent with 
state statutes that provide a safe harbor for directors who rely on outside advice 
but are later accused of breaching their fiduciary duties to shareholders. For 
example, directors of Delaware corporations shall, in the performance of their 
duties, be: 
[F]ully protected in relying in good faith upon the records of the 
corporation and upon such information, opinions, reports or 
statements presented to the corporation by any of the corporation's 
officers or employees, or committees of the board of directors, or by 
any other person as to matters the member reasonably believes are 
within such other person's professional or expert competence and who 
has been selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the 
corporation. 
I d. If the financial advisor's engagement letter exculpates the advisor from, or 
indemnifies the advisor against, liability, the directors would not be allowed to 
sue. The only exception would be in cases of gross negligence or willful 
misconduct. See Daniel C. Cohn, Advising the Board of Directors of a 
Financially-Distressed Company (June 18-19, 2001), at http://www.abiworld. 
org/abidata/online/conference/01banker/Cohn.html; see also Marsha L. 
Goldstein, Retention of Professionals in Bankruptcy Cases: Ethical Issues and 
Special Considerations, in CHAPTER 11 BUSINESS REORGANIZATIONS (2002), 
available at WL SG108 ALI-ABA 245, at *262; Sidney J. Nurkin et al., 
Fiduciary Duties of Boards of Directors of Financially Troubled Corporations, in 
REPRESENTING TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES IN THE NEW BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
(Dec. 2001), available at WL 683 PLI/Pat 213, at *237-38 (noting exception to 
exculpation clauses when director authorizes an unlawful distribution); David 
F. Smith, Investment Banking Perspective, in STRUCTURING MERGERS & 
ACQUISITIONS 2001 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. BO-
OOZD), available at WL 1224 PLI/Corp 7, at *23. 
189. That is, if external experts erroneously conclude that the firm is solvent 
and directors ultimately are sued for the failure to timely file, any 
reimbursement claim should be paid pro rata with other unsecured claims 
rather than being subordinated under section 510 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 
11 u.s.c. § 510 (1994). 
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shareholders, employees, suppliers, and the local community) 
whether the firm is liquidated or reorganized in the bankruptcy 
proceeding. Specifying that directors have a fiduciary duty to the 
firm to file timely a bankruptcy petition will help combat the 
behavioral biases that prevent directors from filing early bankruptcy 
petitions and will also help clarify the current uncertainty directors 
face when considering the scope of their fiduciary duties post-
insolvency. 
